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ABSTRACT
On tens of thousands of occasions each year, state court judges wrongly separate
children from their families and place them in foster care. And while a child is in
foster care, judges are called on to render hundreds of decisions affecting every
aspect of the child’s life. This Article uses insights from social psychology research
to analyze the environment of dependency court and to recommend changes that will
improve decisions. Research indicates that decision makers aware at the time they
make a decision that they will be called upon later to explain it may engage in a
systematic, deliberate decision-making process. On the other hand, decision makers
given an opportunity to justify a decision after making it reflexively may defend the
decision, ignoring or distorting information that would undercut its rationale. This
Article argues that decisions in dependency court are harmed by a shortage of predecisional accountability and an abundance of post-decisional opportunities to selfdefensively bolster decisions previously made. The Article draws from social
psychology research to recommend concrete changes to promote effective decisionmaking processes in dependency court. Recommendations include opening
dependency courts, expanding appeal rights, dispersing decision making authority
from a single judge to multiple judges, and using “case rounds,” drawn from medical
school and law school clinical education programs, to provide judges with diverse
perspectives on decisions with which they are faced. Finally, I recommend
directions for empirical research in the unique environment of dependency court.

*
Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, 2010-2012; Associate
Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia. I am grateful to Hon. Richard A.
Posner, Alan Schwartz, Donald Langevoort, Jane Aiken, Annette Appell, Naomi Cahn,
Carolyn Grose, Michele Gilman, Josh Gupta-Kagan, Margaret Johnson, Ann Shalleck, and
Jane Spinak for commenting on drafts of this Article. Thanks especially to Gregory Mitchell
of the University of Virginia School of Law for substantial guidance and support throughout
this project. Georgetown’s law library and faculty support staff provided extraordinary
research assistance, as did Darla Bardine, Lana Castor, and Meredith Kinner. I am grateful to
Georgetown University Law Center for financial support.

913

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2358602
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358602

914

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:913

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 914	
  
II. DECISION-MAKING .............................................................. 919	
  
III. DECISION-MAKING IN CHILD DEPENDENCY
CASES .................................................................................. 924	
  
A. Wrong Decisions.......................................................... 924
B. Tough Choices, High Stakes, and Bad Outcomes ....... 928
C. The Decision-Making Environment—
A Breeding Ground for Mental Shortcuts.................... 935	
  
1. Ambiguous Role of Family Court Judges ............ 936	
  
2. High Caseloads and Time Pressure ...................... 938	
  
3. Poverty, Race, and the Master Narrative
of Child Welfare ................................................... 939	
  
4. Need for Cognition ............................................... 940	
  
5. Self-Regulatory Focus .......................................... 942	
  
6. Power .................................................................... 943	
  
D. Cognitive Biases .......................................................... 943	
  
1. Primacy Effect ...................................................... 944	
  
2. Fundamental Attribution Error and OverReliance on Affect ................................................ 947	
  
3. Groupthink............................................................ 949	
  
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................ 952	
  
A. In General .................................................................... 953	
  
B. Accountability in Dependency Cases .......................... 959	
  
1. Pre-Emptive Self-Criticism in Short Supply ........ 959	
  
2. Bolstering in Abundance ...................................... 963	
  
V. IMPROVING DECISION-MAKING IN
DEPENDENCY COURT ........................................................... 967	
  
A. Minimizing Bolstering ................................................... 967	
  
1. Teams of Judges ..................................................... 968	
  
2. Case Rounds ........................................................... 968	
  
3. Regulation of Information Available to Judge ....... 970	
  
B. Increase Pre-Emptive Self-Criticism ............................. 970	
  
1. Counter the Narrative of Child Welfare ................. 970	
  
2. Open Dependency Courts....................................... 971	
  
3. Reason-Giving ........................................................ 972	
  
4. Strengthen Appellate Review ................................. 972	
  
VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 972	
  
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether and when [children] become parents, how far and in what
direction they go in school, whether they obey the law, with whom they
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associate, and how healthy they will be are only some of the important
life outcomes that will be shaped by the decisions made in juvenile court.1
How do dependency judges make these decisions, in the balance of which hang
children’s lives?2 In general, the answer is that dependency3 judges, like other
humans, jump to conclusions, deliberate insufficiently, and ignore or avoid
information that would help them reach better outcomes. This Article explains that
it is not their fault, and that there are solutions.
To understand dependency judges’ decisions, we first must understand our own.
Here is a test:
Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest
in people, or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he has a need
for order and structure, and a passion for detail.4
Is Steve a farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, or physician?5
The information provided about Steve is congruent with stereotypical notions
about librarians. Steve is “representative”6 of librarians. As a result, many will
assume that Steve is, in fact, a librarian. This assumption, however, ignores facts
that make a different conclusion more likely, namely that there are many more
farmers than librarians in the population.
Which is a more likely cause of death in the United States—being killed
by falling airplane parts or by a shark?7
As to sharks and airplane parts, well, you are thirty times less likely to die in a
shark’s jaws than under the weight of a falling airplane part.8 If you are like most
people, though, you guessed wrong.9 Shark attacks get much more media attention
and come to mind much more easily; shark attacks’ greater cognitive “availability”10
fooled you into thinking that they are a more common occurrence.
1
Emily Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and What Lawyers and Judges can do About it, 6
NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 321 (2011).
2

See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Blinking on the Bench]
(asking, more generally, “How do judges judge?”).
3
Proceedings involving children under the supervision of the state because of suspicion
of child maltreatment are labeled in various states as “juvenile,” “neglect,” “child in need of
assistance,” “child welfare,” “child protection,” or “dependency” proceedings. For ease of
reference, I refer to the proceedings as dependency proceedings throughout this Article.
4

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
5

Id.

6

Id.

7

SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121 (1993).

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1127.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2358602

916

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:913

These questions, and the perhaps unexpected complexity of their answers, begin
to suggest the complexity of human decision-making processes. This Article
explores the factors that sometimes cause decision-makers to ignore relevant
information, to prioritize irrelevant information, or to place too much or too little
weight on information that is available to them. When do judges and other humans11
use speedy, intuitive decision-making processes, known as heuristics, to reach
conclusions, and when do we use deliberate, effortful, systematic strategies? What
do we do when we decide?
Scholars have explored decision-making in a wide range of areas of the law by
looking for clues in concrete evidence such as statutes and written judicial
opinions.12 This Article contextualizes decision-making in dependency court.
Because of the paucity of written trial court opinions in this field, however, I apply
to that under-explored territory a rather more archaeological approach than that used
by others in the “behavioral law and economics”13 literature. Instead of unearthing
from judges’ public writings an implicit or express statement about the decisionmaking process they used to reach a conclusion,14 I work backwards, or perhaps
upwards, by analyzing the decision-making environment of dependency court. I
present in detail the context in which judges make decisions, and then apply
psychology research to determine whether the conditions present in dependency
court are like those found by researchers to encourage use of heuristic or systematic
processes. Judges make decisions under the severe time pressures of large
caseloads, with a paucity of reliable information, and themselves unavoidably
11
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 410
(1973) (“[W]e must face the fact that judges are human.”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
& Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001)
[hereinafter Inside the Judicial Mind] (“Judges, it seems, are human.”) (citing Jerome Frank,
Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 233 (1931)); see also Chad Oldfather, Judges as
Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 125 (2007).
12

See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995) (employment discrimination).
13
“The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to explore the implications
of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior for the law.” Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476
(1998). But see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not
be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72
(2002) (“Behavioral law and economics scholars simplify and overgeneralize findings on
human cognition and rationality to make these findings seem simultaneously important and
simple enough to be incorporated into legal policy.”)
14
See, e.g., Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Intuition
and Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 21 (2004) (“Duty of care
jurisprudence appears arbitrary because courts have not used empirical or other evidence to
persuade lawyers and corporate directors that duty of care jurisprudence has beneficial effects
on director behavior. Judges have not clarified how they identify which behaviors they use as
evidence that boards have made decisions carefully. For example, judges have never
explained why they have concluded that providing advance notice to directors of the matters
to be discussed at their meetings is evidence of careful decision-making. They have done
nothing more than state this conclusion.”).
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influenced by the pervasive racial and economic disadvantage of the parties who
appear before them. I argue that experimental findings suggest that these
environmental factors are likely to cause judges to use heuristics to make decisions.
Concluding that judges employ heuristics cannot end the inquiry, however.
Under a wide range of circumstances, heuristic decision-making can be a better
choice than slower, more-methodical systematic processing. For example, speedy,
intuitive processing is appropriate for a student when identifying that it is indeed her
familiar math teacher who just walked into the classroom. Accuracy of that decision
is not lessened by the immediate, virtually unthinking method by which the student
arrives at an answer. Nor would the accuracy of that judgment likely improve if the
student engaged in a more systematic approach, such as walking nearer to the person
who entered the room, closely observing the person’s dress and facial features, and
subsequently surveying nearby classmates to ascertain their opinions as to the
identity of the person.
Are dependency court decisions more like deciding whether Steve is a farmer, or
more like deciding whether one’s familiar teacher entered a room? Should
dependency judges reach decisions quickly and efficiently, or slowly and
painstakingly?
This Article marshals evidence from psychology research that suggests that
heuristic decision-making in dependency cases is dangerously likely to lead to
cognitive biases and systematic decision errors. In the right setting, heuristics are
aptly titled “fast-and-frugal;” in some situations, less information can be more. In
others, like dependency cases, however, decisions are too hard, and the stakes too
important, for judges to leap to conclusions. As Professor Buss points out, “in
dependency . . . proceedings, decisions are made that . . . surely will determine
young people’s life plans.”15
That analysis of a context-specific decision-making process suggests a useful
research methodology in other legal fields is not to suggest that the questions are
unimportant with respect to dependency. To the contrary, on tens of thousands of
occasions each year, state court judges wrongly approve requests from state
government caseworkers to place children in foster care. Why do judges get it
wrong so often? And while a child is in foster care, judges are called on to render
hundreds of decisions, large and small, affecting every aspect of the child’s life.
Data and children’s stories amply demonstrate the ghastly experience and outcomes
of foster care. When a judge must assess whether a child will be safe at home, or
whether a child should visit with the siblings from whom she has been separated, or
whether a child should be assigned a tutor or a mentor, or undergo psychological
testing—what, really, is she doing? Judges probably ought not assume that Steve is
a librarian and that sharks are a mortal danger.
What can be done to help judges make better decisions?16
15

Buss, supra note 1, at 321.

16

A persuasive body of scholarship argues that the absence from dependency cases of
traditional components of the American adversarial system deprives those cases of structures
fundamental to effective decision-making. See, e.g., Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due
Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases Between Disposition and Permanency, 10
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 15 (2011) (“The absence of greater procedural protections in
hundreds of thousands of abuse and neglect cases . . . leads to poor decisions in abuse and
neglect cases . . . .”); see also Jane Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law,
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891 (2010); Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child
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Lawyers have long believed that decision-making may be aided by “Sunlight[,] .
. . the best of disinfectants.”17 The right to trial by jury and public access to courts
both embody a belief that transparency aids judicial decision-making. As Donald
Langevoort points out, however:
Contemporary legal scholarship has come to recognize that if . . .
predictions [about human behavior] are naive and intuitive, without any
strong empirical grounding, they are susceptible to error and ideological
bias. Something more rigorous is thus expected when normative claims
are advanced, and the place of the social sciences has expanded in legal
discourse to satisfy this expectation.18
This Article infuses with scientific support the long-held, deeply felt beliefs which
underlie the hoary, vibrant maxim, “justice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”19
Brandeis’s “sunshine” is most nearly akin to a social psychologist’s
“accountability,” namely a decision-maker’s expectation that she will have to
explain or justify a decision. Indeed, research indicates that accountability can
attenuate certain cognitive biases, including those likely present in family court. If a
decision-maker knows, prior to making a decision, that she will be accountable for
that decision to an audience with unknown views, she is likely to engage in “preemptive self-criticism,” slowing down, seeking additional information, integrating
opposing viewpoints, and working until she reaches a decision she believes will be
defensible from the perspective of the audience. As with respect to heuristics,
however, accountability’s effects are context-dependent; a decision-maker asked
only after the decision to explain the decision will seek aggressively to “bolster” her
position, defending the decision and emphasizing the information that supports it,
rather than genuinely reflecting and reexamining the premises of the decision.
Again applying research findings to the context of dependency court, I argue that
the structure and culture of the court is devoid of effective pre-decisional
accountability, and replete with opportunities for judges to bolster and harden
positions previously taken. Under these circumstances, cognitive biases are
exacerbated, not attenuated. Accountability structures in dependency court, then,
degrade decisions in dependency court. As hard and important as are dependency
judges’ decisions, and as vulnerable as they are to inappropriate use of heuristics and
cognitive biases, I hope with this Article to begin a problem-solving conversation
grounded in social science.
Welfare System’s Disregard for the Constitutional Rights of Nonoffending Parents, 82 TEMP.
L. REV. 55 (2009). That this Article argues that there is yet another cause of decision-making
flaws in dependency cases diminishes not at all the extent to which I share their concerns. See
Matthew I. Fraidin, Recent Developments in Family Law in the District of Columbia June
2004-June 2005, 10 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 183 (2007).
17
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914)
(“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
18

Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1500 (1998).
19

R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259 (Eng.).
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II. DECISION-MAKING
We have come to understand that under some circumstances, we are deliberate
and analytical, that other decisions are made by “simpler strategies,” and still others
employ both processes.20 Systematic processing is deliberate and reflects careful
and oft-times lengthy consideration of available information.21 Heuristic decisionmaking, like that which led us to incorrect answers about Steve and sharks, above, in
contrast, is inductive, speedy, and instinctive, and requires minimal effort.22
Kahneman describes this as “attribute substitution,” namely making a judgment
(“assess[ing] a target attribute”) by assessing a different subject, which is easier to
understand or more readily-accessible to the decision-maker, rather than the actual
decision at hand.23 More simply, Korobkin says, “Reliance on a heuristic implies
neglect of at least some potentially relevant information.”24
Kahneman and Tversky identified common heuristic devices on which we rely to
reach decisions. These include the “availability” heuristic and “representativeness”
heuristic. Subsequent research has identified other “mental shortcuts” which prompt
decisions in a similar manner, such as reliance on the affect, or feelings generated in
the decision-maker by the person or argument.25
The availability heuristic is a “rule of thumb”26 which causes decision-makers to
“assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which

20

According to Reimer et al., “heuristic processing is particularly likely to take place in
situations in which people are not motivated or for other reasons are not able to think
thoroughly about the contents of a message . . . . In contrast, systematic processing is likely
to occur in situations in which participants are highly motivated and able to scrutinize a
message.” Torsten Reimer et al., On the Interplay Between Heuristic and Systematic
Processes in Persuasion, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 1833-34 (B.G. Bara, L. Barsalou & M. Bucciarelli eds.,
2005).
21

DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 13 (2011).

22

See Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710 (1994) (contrasting “two fundamentally different ways [of
apprehending reality], one variously labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal,
narrative, and experiential, and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational.”); see
also Reimer et al., supra note 20, at 1833 (“Higher-order cognitive processes are often
described by dual-process models that distinguish between systematic (deliberate, top-down,
explicit, conscious) and heuristic (automatic, bottom-up, implicit, unconscious) processing.”).
23

Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 49, 53 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
24

Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW
47 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., 2006).
25

See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen, Geoffrey P. Kramer & Karin Süsser, Happiness and
Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 621, 628
(1994); Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, 397 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds.,
2002).
26

PLOUS, supra note 7, at 121.
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instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.”27 Thus, rather than methodically
combing through the information and factors present in an immediate, present
problem, a decision-maker employing the availability heuristic reaches a decision by
immediate, reflexive reference to a different situation that comes readily to mind.
Instances come to mind more readily if they are “retrieveable,”28 salient,29 vivid,30 or
recent.31
The probability of the occurrence of shark attack is vastly overestimated vis-à-vis
death due to the impact of a falling airplane because shark attacks receive greater
publicity than do deaths from falling airplane pieces, and because death by shark
attack is far easier to imagine in vivid detail than death by airplane part. Shark
attacks, then, are more readily available in the consciousness of the survey
respondents. Similarly, the significantly greater media coverage of homicides and
car accidents makes them far more “available” than cancer and diabetes; thus, survey
respondents guessed incorrectly that homicides and car accidents kill more
Americans than do diabetes and cancer.32
The “representativeness” heuristic similarly reflects a decision-maker’s
substitution of one item for another. A decision-maker who relies on the
representativeness heuristic assesses a probability “by the degree to which A is
representative of B, that is, by the degree to which A resembles B.”33 Thus, we are
told that “Steve,” described at the beginning of this Part, possesses specified
personal characteristics. Because we associate those traits with librarians, we jump
to the conclusion that Steve is a librarian. For many of us, regardless of the fact that
there are few librarians, Steve embodies librarian, and we therefore assume that he is
more likely to be a librarian than to work in a much more common profession.
“Affect,” or the good or bad feelings generated by a person or event, is another
heuristic that sometimes drives decision-making.34 Compared to systematic,
27

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1127.

28

See id. (describing experiment in which subjects were given lists of the names of
famous men and women, and “asked to judge whether the list contained more names of men
than of women;” “subjects erroneously judged that the class (sex) that had the more famous
personalities was the more numerous.”).
29

“[T]he impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents
is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.” Id.
30

PLOUS, supra note 7, at 125-26 (“Vividness usually refers to how concrete or
imaginable something is, although occasionally it can have other meanings. Sometimes
vividness refers to how emotionally interesting or exciting something is, or how close
something is in space or time. A number of studies have shown that decision makers are
affected more strongly by vivid information than by pallid, abstract, or statistical
information.”) (citation omitted).
31

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1127; see also Jane Kennedy, Debiasing Audit
Judgment with Accountability: A Framework and Experimental Results, 31 J. OF ACCT. RES.
231 (1993).
32

PLOUS, supra note 7, at 121-22.

33

Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 4, at 1124.

34

Slovic et al., supra note 23, at 397 (“As used here, affect means the specific quality of
‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (1) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and
(2) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus.”).
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analytical processing, “reliance on affect and emotion is a quicker, easier, and more
efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous
world.”35 Thus, a choice among options sometimes is rooted in whether one option
causes us to feel fear, sadness, or disgust, and another generates in us more welcome
emotions, such as happiness, safety, or comfort. As Zajonc wrote:
We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational manner and
weigh all the pros and cons of the various alternatives. But . . . quite often
“I decided in favor of X” is no more than “I liked X.” . . . We buy the
cars we like, choose the jobs and houses that we find “attractive,” and
then justify these choices by various reasons.36
Like “representativeness” and “availability,” affect may cause a decision-maker to
forgo “weighing the pros and cons or retrieving from memory many relevant
examples, especially when the required judgment or decision is complex or mental
resources are limited.”37
Notwithstanding the framing in this Part thus far of heuristic thinking as harmful,
negative, and inaccurate, heuristic decision-making can be valid and useful if
employed in the appropriate context. Indeed, sometimes described as “fast-andfrugal”38 strategies, heuristics can be more accurate, or simply a better choice than
systematic processing, in light of the greater effort it might take to be more
systematic, or the necessity of speedy decision-making, or the minimal importance
of the outcome.39 Gerd Gigerenzer et al., describes a heuristic as “ecologically
rational to the degree that it is adapted to the structure of an environment.”40
We easily can imagine circumstances in which a decision’s context permits—or
even requires—speedy, intuitive decision-making. A baseball outfielder eyeing a fly
ball, for example, ought not attempt to catch it by pulling from his pocket a set of
opera glasses to make sure he truly has a bead on the thing, and punching buttons on
a satellite reader to ascertain numerically the ball’s precise trajectory and speed.
Instead, the ballplayer gauges the speed and distance promptly—indeed,
immediately—with an experienced, expert eye, and chases after it fast, but not so
fast that he’ll run too far. Where will the ball land? This is a decision that must be
35

Id. at 398.

36

R. B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151, 155 (1980).
37

Slovic et al., supra note 23, at 400.

38

GERD GIGERENZER, RATIONALITY FOR MORTALS: HOW PEOPLE COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY
22 (2008) (“A fast and frugal heuristic is a strategy, conscious or unconscious, that searches
for minimal information and consists of building blocks that exploit evolved capacities and
environmental structures.”).
39

Peter M. Todd argues that the use of heuristics is determined by evolutionary responses
to external stimuli which affect decision-making: “the human mind makes many decisions by
drawing on an adaptive toolbox of simple heuristics . . . because these fast and informationfrugal heuristics are well matched to the challenges of the (past) environment.” Peter M. Todd,
Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bound Minds, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY:
THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 52 (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001).
40

GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GRP., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT
MAKE US SMART 13 (1999).
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reached quickly.41 Like the young student faced with the relatively simple, lowimport decision about who is entering the classroom, circumstances indicate that
some decisions are best made with a minimum of information.42
In contrast, however, systematic processing has been shown to be more effective
in some circumstances than heuristic thinking. A well-known illustration is the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT),43 in which three questions are administered to
respondents:
1.
2.
3.

A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?
If it takes five machines five minutes to make five widgets, how long
would it take one-hundred machines to make one-hundred widgets?
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles
in size. If it takes forty-eight days for the patch to cover the entire
lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?

Professor Frederick administered the CRT on thirty-five occasions, to a total of
3,428 subjects. Most respondents answered ten cents to question one, 100 minutes
to question two, and answered twenty-four days to question three.44 Those answers,
however, are incorrect. The correct answers are five cents, five minutes, and fortyseven days. In total, seventeen percent of respondents correctly answered all three
questions. Thirty-three percent answered all three incorrectly. On average,
respondents provided correct answers to 1.24 of the three questions.45 The nature of
the questions and their wording causes many respondents to jump quickly to
incorrect answers, and to be unable to adjust to reach the correct answer. These
appear to be problems that would benefit from deliberate, analytical analysis.
Judges are not immune to heuristic decision-making, or to the errors that can
result. Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that judges demonstrate in experimental
settings non-deliberate thinking, in ways that mimic the heuristic processes
employed by others. Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich administered to judges
experiments designed to test subjects’ decision-making processes. In one study, 252
judges completed the Cognitive Reflection Test. Like most people, “most of the
judges answered most of the questions wrong . . . . [W]hen the judges erred, they
generally chose the intuitive answer.”46 In other experiments, judges were
susceptible to cognitive biases such as “anchoring,”47 overuse of the
41

See, e.g., GIGERENZER, supra note 38, at 21 (citing RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH
GENE 96 (2d ed. 1989)).
42

Gerd Gigerenzer describes this as the “less-is-more” effect, noting that research has
shown that in some contexts, “simple heuristics were more accurate than standard statistical
methods that have the same or more information. These results became known as less-is-more
effects . . . [T]here is a point at which more is not better, but harmful.” Gerd Gigerenzer &
Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 453 (2011).
43
Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005,
at 25, 25-42.
44

Id. at 27.

45

Id. at 29.

46

Blinking on the Bench, supra note 2, at 17-18.

47

Id. at 19.
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representativeness heuristic,48 and “hindsight bias.”49 The results of the studies
indicate that “judges rely heavily on their intuitive faculties . . . when they face the
kinds of problems they generally see on the bench.”50
In sum, systematic processing of information connotes careful, intentional,
deliberative weighing of probative information. Heuristic processing causes a
decision-maker to reach a conclusion based on the ease or speed with which a
similar event or problem (or one perceived to be similar) is brought to mind, the
extent to which a decision-problem resembles another decision-problem, or the
affect, or feelings generated in the decision-maker by the person or argument. In
some circumstances, the use of heuristics can mislead or distort, as exemplified in
the “Steve,” “sharks,” and Cognitive Reflection Test illustrations, above.
Appropriateness of the use of systematic or heuristic decision-making can be
adjudged only by taking into account the context in which the decision is made,
including the importance of the decision and the time available to make the
decision.51 Heuristics inappropriate for the environment can lead to systematic
errors, known as cognitive biases, which themselves result in “suboptimal judgments
and choices because the [judges] over- or underweight information concerning facts
. . . or their subjective preferences relative to that information’s probative value.”52
In Part II, I begin the process of assessing decision-making in dependency court.
I put dependency court under a magnifying glass, first presenting the many varied
decisions dependency judges are called on to make. I then determine whether the
conditions under which judges make decisions permit systematic consideration of
evidence or are more likely to lead to non-deliberate, heuristic decision-making.
Finally, I explore the existence of cognitive biases in dependency court, including
the “dispositional bias in attribution,”53 “primacy effect,”54 “susceptibility to
groupthink symptoms,”55 and “influence of incidental affect from one situation on
judgments in unrelated situations.”56
III. DECISION-MAKING IN CHILD DEPENDENCY CASES
Dependency judges make a large number and wide range of decisions about
every child whose life they oversee. Virtually all of those decisions are tough ones,
48

Id. at 22.

49

Id. at 24.

50

Id. at 27.

51

Id. at 5 (“Intuition is dangerous not because people rely on it but because they rely on it
when it is inappropriate to do so.”).
52

Korobkin, supra note 24, at 47.

53

See generally Edward E. Jones, Janet Morgan Riggs & George Quattrone, Observer
Bias in the Attitude Attribution Paradigm: Effect of Time and Information Order, 37 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1230 (1979).
54

See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First
Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285 (1983).
55
See generally Irving L. Janis, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982).
56

Bodenhausen, Kramer & Süsser, supra note 25, at 630.
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and most have very high stakes, putting a premium on an effective decision-making
process.
Dependency judges first decide a child’s custodial placement just before or just
after the child’s emergency removal from his parents or guardian. This decision has
significant consequences for a child’s health, safety, and emotional well-being, as
well as significant legal import. Nonetheless, a growing body of evidence indicates
that judges regularly make the wrong choice at this stage.57
Judges also make decisions relating to virtually every other aspect of a child’s
health, safety, and welfare. These decisions make a significant impact on children’s
lives, and require subtle differentiation between and among numerous options, many
of which require predictions of future behavior. These are hard, important decisions.
A. Wrong Decisions
Eight-year-old Jerome steals his uncle’s video game. Furious, the uncle
storms to Brian’s schoolhouse and physically beats Brian in the hallway.
Instead of sending Brian home to his mother’s embrace, social services
workers take him into state custody. Even though the uncle does not live
with Brian or either of the child’s parents, the social services agency
requests three days later that the child remain in foster care. The judge
agrees. Two-and-a-half months later, the government acknowledges that
Brian is not in danger. They drop the case and send him home.58
A fifteen-year-old boy, James, watches his stepfather die of a heart attack.
His grown sister is ready, willing, and able to take him in. Instead, the
government asks the judge to house James with strangers in foster care,
and the judge complies. After five weeks, the government sends him home
to live with the sister.59
A seven-year-old boy, Isaac, is taken from his mother because his
grandfather—who does not live with the mother—allegedly beats him.
The judge approves Isaac’s foster care placement, rejecting his mother’s
request that the boy be allowed to come home. The boy lives with
strangers for six weeks, even though two loving, capable, professional
aunts are available to take him in. He sees his mother only two hours
each week. He is finally allowed to live with one aunt, with whom he

57

THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA CITIZEN REVIEW PANEL (CRP), AN EXAMINATION OF THE CHILD
AND FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY’S PERFORMANCE WHEN IT REMOVES CHILDREN FROM AND
QUICKLY RETURNS THEM TO THEIR FAMILIES 4 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter CRP Report],
available at http://www.dc-crp.org/Citizen_Review_Panel_CFSA_Quick_Exits_Study.pdf
(concluding that it “was often wrong to conclude that removing children from their families
on an emergency basis was necessary to address [safety concerns].”).
58

Facts taken from a case in which author’s clinical law students at the University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law represented “Jerome’s” mother. See
also Petula Dvorak, Child Deaths Led to Excessive Foster Care Placements, Critics Say,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009.
59

Facts taken from a case in which author’s clinical law students at the University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law represented “James’s” mother.
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stays for another six weeks—until the judge determines the boy was not
abused. After three months, he goes back home.60
In every state and the District of Columbia, an Executive Branch social work
agency is responsible for taking into custody children whose families cannot care for
them safely.61 States may take custody of a child when the child is suspected of
being in “immediate danger”62 or “imminent danger.”63 Endangered children
60
Facts taken from a case in which author’s clinical law students at the University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law represented “Isaac’s” mother.
61

See D.C. CODE § 4-1303.01(b)(4) (2012) (“The [Child and Family Services] Agency
shall have as its functions and purposes . . . [r]emoving children from their homes or other
places, when necessary.”); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1 (West 2012) (“The purpose of this
Act is to create a Department of Children and Family Services to provide social services to
children and their families . . . . This primary and continuing responsibility applies whether
the family unit . . . remains intact . . . or whether the unit has been temporarily broken by
reason of child abuse, neglect, dependency or other reasons necessitating state care . . . .”);
MD. CODE ANN., HUM. SERVS. § 3-201(a)(3) (West 2012) (“A local department shall be
referred to as the department of social services . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN., HUM. SERVS.
§ 5-710(a) (West 2012) (“the local department shall render the appropriate services in the best
interests of the child . . . .”). According to a 2010 report released by the Adoption and Foster
Care Analysis Reporting System (AFCARS), 254,375 children were removed from their
families [entered foster care], part of a total of 408,425 children nationwide in “out-of-home”
care. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN.
ON CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT (June 2011),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport18.pdf. With 739
children in foster care, Delaware has the smallest population of children in custody and
California leads the nation, with 58,718 children in foster care. Id. The state of Wyoming has
the highest rate of children in foster care, with 7.5 of every 1,000 children entering the system
in 2010. See id. The state of Minnesota removes the highest percentage of its poor children,
with 84.8% of impoverished children in foster care. NAT’L COALITION FOR CHILD PROT.
REFORM (NCCPR), THE 2002 NCCPR RATE-OF-REMOVAL INDEX 6 (2001), available at
http://www.nfpn.org/images/stories/files/removal_rates.pdf. The city of San Francisco took
custody of the greatest proportion of its low-income children and youth, with 27.1% of
impoverished children entering the system. NAT’L COALITION FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM
(NCCPR), THE 2011 NCCPR CALIFORNIA RATE-OF-REMOVAL INDEX 5-7 (2011), available at
http://www.nccpr.org/reports/2009californiaror.pdf.
62
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 5-709(c) (West 2012) (“the representative [of
the local social services department] may remove the child temporarily, without prior approval
by the juvenile court, if the representative believes the child is in serious, immediate danger.”)
(emphasis added); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51B(c) (West 2012) (“If the
department has reasonable cause to believe a child’s health or safety is in immediate danger
from abuse or neglect, the department shall take a child into immediate temporary custody . . .
.”) (emphasis added).
63

See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1022(a)(i)(B) (McKinney 2005) (“The family court may
enter an order directing the temporary of a child . . . before filing a petition [for removal] if . . .
the child appears to suffer from the abuse or neglect of his or her parent . . . that his or her
immediate removal is necessary to avoid imminent danger to the child’s life or health . . . .”)
(emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401(1)(b)(1) (West 2012) (a child may be
taken into custody if the proper authority “has probable cause to support a finding: 1) That the
child has been abused, neglected, or abandoned, or is suffering from or is in imminent danger
or illness or injury as a result of abuse, neglect or abandonment.”) (emphasis added); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(A)(1) (West 2012) (“A child may be taken into immediate custody and
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typically come to the State’s attention on the basis of a report telephoned to the
agency by a neighbor, relative, or professional service provider, such as a doctor,
nurse, therapist, teacher, or school guidance counselor.64 In 2010, 2,607,798 such
reports were made.65 Investigating social workers determined that 436,321 of those
children were abused or neglected.66
After determining that a child is in danger, social workers either take a child into
custody immediately, or take the child into custody after brief, ex parte judicial
review and approval of the seizure. In either event, state and federal statutes and
constitutional law require that a court review the child’s separation from family
within twenty-four hours to two weeks.67
At this hearing, variously titled a “shelter care”68 hearing or “preliminary”69
hearing, the court must make its first important decision regarding the child, namely
whether the child would be in immediate danger if returned home, and therefore
must instead be housed with a relative, or a foster family unknown to the child.70
The court’s decision often is made on the basis of the testimony of a single witness,

placed in shelter care pursuant to an emergency removal order [if it is established that] . . . the
child would be subjected to an imminent threat to life or health . . . .”) (emphasis added).
64

See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS
2-3 (2010), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/
manda.cfm (distinguishing “mandatory” reporters, which includes teachers or professional
services providers who have a professional duty to report abuse and “voluntary” reporters,
which refers to anyone who suspects abuse, such as a neighbor or relative).
65

CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. CHILD MALTREATMENT
2010 11 (2010), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf.
66

Id. at 12.

67

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.402(8)(a) (West 2009) (a child removed pursuant to an
emergency order “may not be held in shelter care longer than 24 hours unless an order is
entered by the court after a shelter care hearing.”); VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-251(B) (West
2012) (if a child is removed pursuant to an emergency order, a hearing must be held as soon as
practicable, but no later than 5 business days after removal); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
262.103 (West 2011) (“A temporary restraining order or attachment of the child . . . expires
not later than 14 days after [the date of removal].”).
68
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2312(B) (2011) (“A shelter care hearing shall be commenced
not later than 72 hours (excluding Sundays) after the child has been taken into custody . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
69

See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-252(A) (West 2012) (the court may issue a preliminary
removal order after a hearing that “shall be in the nature of a preliminary hearing rather than a
final determination of custody.”) (emphasis added).
70

See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)-(c) (2012) (during the shelter care hearing, the judge also
decides whether the agency made “reasonable efforts to . . . prevent the unnecessary removal”
of the child, and whether it would be “contrary to [the child’s] welfare” to return home. These
decisions are required by federal law as a condition of receiving funding assistance from the
federal government.).
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the social worker who investigated the allegations of child abuse or neglect. Hearsay
testimony is permissible.71
Separation of a child from her home, family, and community, and, often, school,
is a traumatic event for the child, potentially causing significant harm.72 So too is
this a significant constitutional moment, potentially infringing on a parent’s
fundamental right to the custody, control, and management of the child.73 The
decision to approve or reject a removal has dramatic, long-lasting consequences on
the child74 and on the course of the dependency litigation itself.75 Notwithstanding
the momentousness of this juncture in a case and in a child’s life, a growing body of
evidence indicates that judges regularly wrongly “rubber-stamp”76 approval of foster
care requests.
According to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services figures for 2008,
85,000 children were removed from their families, but later were returned without
being found abused or neglected, a full forty percent of all children taken into foster
care during the year.77
Students at the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of
Law represented in dependency matters a random sampling of twenty-five parents
whose children were removed by the Executive and whose removals were approved

71

See D.C. CODE §16-2310(b) (West 2009) (shelter care decision based on all “available
information”); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.070(a) (West 2012) (“The court may
conduct a hearing on the petition in an informal manner.”).
72

See generally Press Release, Richard Wexler & Matthew I. Fraidin, Number of D.C.
Families Torn Apart Soars 41 Percent in Wake of Fenty’s “Foster Care Panic” Advocates Say
(Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/dc1709.pdf (explaining that
separation has deleterious, long term effects on children regardless of the length of time they
are in custody).
73
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“The rights to conceive and to raise
one’s children have been deemed ‘essential’, ‘basic civil rights of man’, and ‘rights far more
precious . . . than property rights.’”) (citations omitted); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model
parents . . . .”).
74
See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal
in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 460-61 (2003) (“What is forgotten or
ignored during removal . . . is the range and extent of harm that [a child experiences] that can
result from unnecessary removals . . . [M]ultiple [foster care] placements . . . combined with .
. . the removal itself, may cause children to develop posttraumatic stress disorder, reactive
attachment disorder, or other major psychiatric illnesses.”).
75
See In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 786 (D.C. 1990) (Rogers, C.J., concurring) (noting “the
reality that [temporary custody] orders may effectively become permanent as a result of the
delays attendant to litigation and appeal.”).
76

THERESE ROE LUND & JENNIFER RENNE, CHILD SAFETY: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND
ATTORNEYS 11 (2009), available at http://www.nrccps.org/documents/2009/pdf/
The_Guide.pdf.
77

See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 65, at 5 (finding that in 2010, state and local CPS
agencies investigated 1,793,724 reports of abuse and neglect and found 1,262,118 of these
reports to be unsubstantiated).
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by judges. Sixty percent of those children were returned home without being found
abused or neglected, and their cases were closed.78
Additional evidence comes from the District of Columbia as well, where the
federally-mandated Citizens’ Review Panel79 found that children not in immediate
danger routinely are taken from their families. 80 Those removals were approved by
the judges charged with oversight.81
In Texas, the Supreme Court found that 468 children separated from their parents
on the Yearning For Zion Ranch near Eldorado, Texas, were not in immediate
danger and should not have been removed.82 New York’s highest state court found
that hundreds of children who were not in danger were separated from their mothers
nonetheless.83 And several federal appellate courts have found that children were
taken from their families unlawfully.84
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economics Professor Joseph Doyle
provides evidence which is suggestive that judges who decide whether to approve
Executive removals repeatedly fail to distinguish between children who are in
immediate danger and children who are not. After studying more than 15,000
maltreated children, Doyle found that among similarly-maltreated children, those
who were allowed to remain at home fared better with respect to future rates of
incarceration, employment, homelessness, and education than those placed in state
custody.85 Though probative only circumstantially, it seems fair to wonder whether
the children whose foster care placement caused more harm than good were, at the
time they entered foster care, genuinely in immediate danger.
B. Tough Choices, High Stakes, and Bad Outcomes
Life-and-death decisions. No obvious answers. What is a judge to do?
The mother of a seven-year-old girl delusionally believes that family
members regularly fill her apartment with an invisible, poisonous gas.
When the girl was a toddler, her mother brought her to the apartment’s
balcony to sleep, fearing that the fumes would overtake them. The girl is
78

Press Release, Wexler & Fraidin, supra note 72, at 7.

79

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(c)(4)(A) (West 2012) (requiring any state that applies for a
grant under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) to establish a citizen
review panel to examine the policies and procedures of state and local CPS agencies and
evaluate the efficacy of the agencies’ responses to reports of abuse and neglect).
80
See CRP Report, supra note 57, at 5 (“No immediate danger to children justified
CFSA’s quick removals in the majority of cases.”).
81

See id. at app. G, 6 (“The [Report’s] conclusion that . . . removal was not warranted . . .
is clearly at odds with the decisions made by . . . the Court on those same cases.”).
82

In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Prot. Servs., 255 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. 2008) (per
curiam) (“On the record before us, removal of the children was not warranted.”).
83

See generally Nicholson v. Scopetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).

84

See, e.g., Gates v. Texas Dep’t. of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 577 F.3d 404, 429
(5th Cir. 2008); Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1298 (9th Cir. 2007);
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 608 (2d Cir. 1999).
85

See generally Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring
the Effects of Foster Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583 (Dec. 2007).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2358602

2013]

DECISION-MAKING IN DEPENDENCY COURT

929

successful in school, happy, healthy, well-fed, and well-loved. The State
argues that the mother’s mental illness puts the child at risk, and asks that
the judge find that the girl is neglected. The mother points to the child’s
glittering report card and up-to-date vaccination record, and asks the
judge to dismiss the case.86
What should the judge decide?
A child is committed to a psychiatric ward, widely-known for its poor
conditions, after threatening to kill a roommate in a group home. After a
few days, the child’s condition stabilizes and he is ready to be discharged.
But the child welfare agency asks the judge to order that the child remain
in the hospital, because the agency cannot locate a foster home or group
home with space for the child. Their only option, they say, is to house the
boy overnight in the agency’s waiting room.87
Should the judge release the boy from the hospital, or order that he remain?
Kevin, eighteen months, is HIV+. His weight and viral load have
careened up and down in the past few months, while his mother and the
world-famous doctor at a local hospital meticulously track his intake of
food, water, and medication. Kevin’s mother loses confidence in the
doctor, and announces her plan to seek treatment for Kevin from a doctor
across town, with whom the social worker and judge are unfamiliar. The
social worker asks the judge to order that the mother continue taking
Kevin to the world-famous doctor. 88
Should the judge decide that the child must continue receiving treatment from the
famous doctor, or defer to the mother’s judgment about what is best for her son?
A Michigan mother, hearing-impaired, has two children who also are
hearing-impaired. The child welfare agency insists that she have the
children undergo surgery that would improve their hearing. The mother
refuses, insisting that the shared hearing impairment is an important bond
between the children and her, and that altering that bond by correcting
their hearing would do more harm than good.89
Should the judge decide in favor of the agency or the mother?

86

In re E.H., 718 A.2d. 162 (D.C. 1998).

87

Facts adapted from In re B.B. (D.C. Super. Ct.), a case in which the author represented

B.B.
88

Facts adapted from In re K.M., 09 Neg. 20, 09 JSF 50 (D.C. Super. Ct.); see also In re
G.K., 993 A.2d 558, 570 (D.C. 2010) (holding that the trial court erred in “delegating to
CFSA the ultimate responsibility to make decisions about whether it was [in the child’s] best
interest to continue taking his psychotropic medications . . . Further, the Family Court cannot
exercise its discretion as parens patriae to intervene and overrule a parent's prerogative unless
it finds by clear and convincing evidence that doing so would be in the best interests of the
child.”).
89

See generally The Grand Rapids Case, COCHLEARWAR.COM, http://www.cochlearwar.com/
newsflash/003a.html (last visited July 30, 2012).
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A dependency judge exercises authority over a child for the months or years until
a child is returned home, or is adopted or emancipated. During that time, the judge
may make dozens and even hundreds of decisions about the child’s status as a
dependent child,90 short- and long-term custodial placement,91 and programmatic
services and supports. Each of these decisions may have a significant impact on the
child. In general, judges must attempt the tricky feat of predicting and affecting
future events in a way that will serve a child’s ever-evolving, often-inchoate “best
interests.”92 And most often, the options available to the judge are murky, reliable
facts on which to base the decision in short supply.
Dependency cases generally involve a large number of parties93 and other
individuals and institutions, such as doctors, therapists, teachers, caseworkers, and
90
Most child welfare cases are resolved prior to trial by a plea bargain or stipulation in
which the child’s parent or guardian admits that the child is abused or neglected, obviating the
need for a judge to make a decision. If the parent does not admit that the child is abused or
neglected, federal and state law require that a trial take place within approximately sixty to
one-hundred days after a child’s entry to foster care. At this trial, the judge must decide
whether the government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is
dependent. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2317(b)(2) (2007); In re Kassandra V., 90 A.D.3d. 940,
941 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the subject child has been abused or neglected.”) (citing
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(b) (McKinney 2011)); see also In re Juan M., 968 N.E.2d 1184,
1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“In a proceeding for the adjudication of abused or neglected minors,
the State must prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
91

Judges decide a child’s custodial placement at the disposition hearing. See 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-22(1) (West 2002); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052(a) (McKinney 2010);
see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.521(1) (West 2012). The legal standard at this stage is similar
to that at the initial hearing, namely whether the child can be maintained safely by her parents
or guardian. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.082 (West 2012) (“In making a dispositional
order . . . the court shall keep the health and safety of the child as the court’s paramount
concern and consider (1) the best interests of the child; (2) the ability of the state to take
custody and to care for the child . . . (3) the potential harm to the child caused by the removal
of the child from the home and family environment.”). The child’s custody is reviewed
regularly. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.522 (West 2012) (“The court may change the temporary
legal custody or the conditions of protective supervision at a post-disposition hearing . . . .”).
92

Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word In Court—A Hidden
Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 705 (Dec. 2005) (recognizing that there
is “doubt and uncertainty inherent in [all] legal decisions,” scholars and practitioners long
have bemoaned the unique vagueness of the “best interests” standard); see, e.g., Seema Shah,
Does Research with Children Violate the Best Interests Standard? An Empirical and
Conceptual Analysis, NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y (forthcoming) (manuscript at 27) (“There are
various conceptions of the best interests standard, and one difficulty in evaluating the standard
is that it can mean very different things.”); see id. (manuscript at 27-38) (giving an extended
review of critiques of the best interests standard).
93

See W. VA. R. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT P. R. 3(m) (West 2011) (defining the term
“parties” as “petitioner, the respondent or respondents, and the child or children.”); see also
FLA. R. JUV. P. R. 8.210(a) (West 2012) (“[T]he terms “party” and “parties” shall include the
petitioner, the child, the parent(s) of the child, the department, and the guardian ad litem or the
representative of the guardian ad litem program, when the program has been appointed.”); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1 (West 2012) (identifying the “petitioner” as “the department or a
reputable person [that] believes that a child is neglected or abused . . . .”); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1012(a)-(b) (McKinney 2009) (defining the term “respondent” as “any parent or other
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other service providers. On the basis of information offered by these many system
actors, judges make decisions on subjects as varied as whether a child housed in
foster care will be permitted to visit with her parents, siblings, and other relatives;94
whether a parent or child will be required to undergo a psychological evaluation or
substance abuse treatment; whether a child should be assigned a mentor or tutor;
whether the social work agency must install a wheelchair ramp in the foster home of
a child with a disability; whether a child should be sent to a medical specialist; and
many other decisions. Judges must determine whether a child should be reunified
with her family, or, instead, perhaps, adopted by foster parents.95 The judge must
decide once each year whether the agency has made “reasonable efforts”96 since the
last hearing to bring about reunification or another long-term outcome.97 The child
may wish to appear in court, and the judge will have to decide whether allowing her
to do so would be in the child’s best interests.98 In a state in which dependency
courtrooms are closed to public and press, a judge may be asked to decide whether it
is in a child’s best interests to allow an observer.99
With respect to some issues, the court’s decisions simply reiterate previouslyissued directives. New issues crop up, however, as children live their lives, and

person legally responsible for a child's care who is alleged to have abused or neglected such
child”; and defining the term “child” as “any person or persons alleged to have been abused or
neglected, whichever the case may be.”).
94

See, e.g., In re D.M., 771 A.2d 360, 367 (D.C. 2001) (holding visits between mother
and child should be terminated).
95

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(c) (West 2011) (“At the permanency hearing . . . the court
shall enter one (1) of the following permanency goals . . . (1) returning juvenile to parent . . . (2)
authorizing plan to return juvenile to parent . . . (3) authorizing a plan for adoption . . . .”).
96

See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i) (2012) (“[The CPS agency] must obtain a judicial
determination that it has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan that is in
effect . . . and at least once every twelve months thereafter while the child is in foster care.”);
see also ALA. CODE § 12-15-312(a)(3) (2012) (Within twelve months of the date of removal
and during every twelve month period the child remains in out of home care, the court must
issue an order with specific findings as to whether “reasonable efforts have been made to
finalize the existing permanency plan.”).
97

See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(a)(2) (West 2011) (“[A]fter the initial permanency
hearing, a permanency planning hearing shall be held annually to reassess the permanency
plan selected for the juvenile.); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-338(d) (West 2011) (“At
every permanency planning hearing the court shall make a finding on whether the department
has made reasonable efforts and shall describe the efforts to finalize a permanency plan.”).
98

See FLA. R. JUV. P. R. 8.255(b) (West 2012) (“The child has a right to be present at the
hearing” unless the court finds that the child's mental or physical condition or age is such that
a court appearance is not in the best interests of the child.).
99
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 712A.17(6)-(7) (West 2012) (“A member of a local
foster care review board . . . shall be admitted to a [dependency] hearing . . . . Upon motion of
a party or victim, the court may close the hearing of a case brought under this chapter to
members of the general public . . . .”); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676(a) (West
2012) (“Unless requested by the minor concerning whom the petition has been filed . . . the
public shall not be admitted to a juvenile court hearing.”).
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judges are confronted with these issues as well.100 In a typical case, a judge may
make dozens of decisions within the first six months of a child’s placement in foster
care.
Facts available to a dependency judge are notoriously unreliable. Rules of
evidence, which limit admission of hearsay, apply only in the fact-finding hearing
and in hearings to terminate a parent’s rights; in practice, judges generally conduct
even these trials in a relatively informal manner.101 Thus, rather than obtaining
information by listening to and observing witnesses, and reviewing documents
submitted in a formalistic, rule-bound manner, judges glean information from
unsworn representations by lawyers representing the parties and from social workers
monitoring the child.102
Emotions run high, and interfere with participants’ ability to convey
information.103 Children may be represented by non-lawyers,104 or by lawyers
overburdened with cases105 and underpaid for their labors.106 Parents may be entirely
100

In re S.M., 985 A.2d 413, 420 (D.C. 2009) (finding dependency cases “are unlike civil
cases, which typically involve only facts gone by . . . The ultimate parties in interest are the
[children] themselves. And for them, their lives an ongoing event.”).
101

See Fraidin, supra note 16, at 195 (quoting In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 353 n.6 (D.C.
1992) (“[W]here, as here, the future of a child is at stake, the judge should do her (or his) best
to obtain all of the information needed to effect a judicious disposition. The rigorous
application of evidentiary rules is out of place in a case of this kind . . . .”) (citations omitted))
(“[I]n a 1992 case in which the government sought to terminate the parental rights of a
mother, the Court of Appeals scolded the trial judge for scrupulously applying the rules of
evidence.”).
102
See, e.g., Gupta-Kagan, supra note 16, at 14 (“In tens (and perhaps hundreds) of
thousands of child abuse and neglect cases, judges decide to change children’s permanency
plans based solely on the representations of parties, social workers, and attorneys-not actual
evidence . . . .”).
103
See Chill, supra note 74, at 462 (“Many parents understandably become angry at and
highly suspicious of caseworkers who remove their children for reasons that are not readily
apparent to them—especially when, as is usually the case, the removal occurs without warning
after parents have been speaking and/or working voluntarily with CPS for several days,
weeks, or months. Yet any expression of anger may come back to haunt the parent at a
neglect or termination hearing.”). During the twenty-four hours to two weeks hours preceding
the hearing, the child has resided away from home, in foster care. The parent likely will not
have not seen or spoken to the child, and may not have known where the child is. She may
have consulted frantically with friends and relatives. She may well have spent that time
wracked with guilt, fear, and stress.
104

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.820(1) (West 2012) (“[The term] ‘Guardian ad litem’ . . .
includes the following: a certified guardian ad litem program, a duly certified volunteer, a
staff attorney, contract attorney, or certified pro bono attorney working on behalf of a
guardian ad litem or the program; staff members of a program office; a court appointed
attorney; or a responsible adult who is appointed by the court to represent the best interests of
the child in a proceeding as provided for by law . . . .”).
105

Marcia Robinson Lowry & Sara Bartosz, Why Children Still Need a Lawyer, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 199, 207 (Fall 2007) (“Dependency court lawyers for children are as
overburdened as are the case workers who are responsible for supervising the children’s care
on a day-to-day basis.”); Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34
LAW OF SOC. INQUIRY 523, 528 (Summer 2009) (“Representatives for the child . . . typically
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unrepresented;107 if represented, their lawyers are likely to be operating under severe
pressures which may diminish the quality of their work.108 Government social
workers, who serve as judges’ primary source of information, also are
overburdened,109 hamstrung by their caseloads from generating comprehensive,
accurate information about children for whom they are responsible.
Unsurprisingly, foster care does not work for most children and youth.110 Thirty
percent of foster care alumni experience symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress
have high caseloads—100 to 150—and therefore cannot often play an active role in routine
decision making.”).
106
See E-mail from Vicky Masden Arrowood, to author (Mar. 15, 2010) (on file with
author) (stating in Kentucky, for example, lawyers may bill only $250.00 to $500.00 per
case); MASS. COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERV., ASSIGNED COUNSEL MANUAL ch. 5, at 34 (Nov.
2011) (stating in Massachusetts, court-appointed lawyers are paid at the rate of $50.00 per
hour).
107

See Vivek S. Sankaran, No Harm, No Foul? Why Harmless Error Analysis Should Not
be Used to Review Wrongful Denials of Counsel to Parents in Child Welfare Cases, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 13, 24-26 (Autumn 2011) (finding at least twelve states do not “offer parents an attorney
at public expense whenever the state seeks to remove children from their care . . . . [but]
because of the critical strategic importance of the preliminary protective hearing, it is essential
that parents have meaningful legal representation at [these] hearing[s].”); see also In re C.M.,
No. 2011-647, 2012 WL 2479619, at *776 (N.H. June 29, 2012) (holding that “due process
does not require that indigent parents have a per se right to appointed counsel in abuse and
neglect proceedings . . . .”).
108
See ASTRA OUTLEY, REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS 8 (June 2004), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Foster_care_reform/Representation%5B2%5D.pdf
(“Most
attorneys for parents receive either a low hourly rate or a small flat fee per case. Because they
are minimally compensated for their time, attorneys are discouraged from carrying out
essential preparations, such as meeting, interviewing and counseling clients; conveying basic
information about the court system and proceedings to their clients; spending time reviewing
their client’s case files; conducting necessary research; preparing witnesses to testify; filing
motions; and otherwise preparing for their case.”); COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL SYSTEM: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.courtexcellence.org/uploads/
publications/WEBSITE_CCAN_REPORT_FINAL_2005.pdf (finding that since at least 1993,
the D.C. Family Court has been aware that “[s]ome lawyers felt their ability to be zealous
advocates was chilled, as they believed judges would not appoint them to cases if they
represented their clients too vigorously.”). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. ON CHILDREN
& THE LAW, NATIONAL PROJECT TO IMPROVE REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS INVOLVED IN THE
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, available at http://www.abanet.org/child/parentrepresentation/
project%20description.pdf.
109
MICHELE ESTRIN GILMAN, THE POVERTY DEFENSE (forthcoming) (manuscript at 39)
(“[C]hild welfare workers are often overworked and overwhelmed . . . .”); see also Lowry &
Bartosz, supra note 105, at 207.
110

See Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for
Comprehensive, Realistic and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 141, 148 (Fall 2006) (“[P]lacement in foster care itself—even temporarily—poses a
risk of harm to children. The standards require no analysis of the specific placement of a child
if removed from her parents, what resources that specific placement has to care for the child
adequately, what emotional effect a removal will have on the child, or what practical effect
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Disorder in their lifetime.111 Nearly fourteen percent of youth who emancipate from
foster care become homeless within twelve months.112 Former foster youth tragically
outpace other children in rates of early pregnancy, domestic violence,
unemployment, and high school dropout rates.113 By some estimates, within two
years of leaving foster care approximately twenty-four percent of emancipated youth
will be incarcerated.114 Perhaps most distressing, children fare worse in foster care
than similarly-maltreated children who are simply left at home.115
Judges’ decisions ought not shoulder all of the blame for the harm children
experience in foster care, or for the systematically unsatisfactory outcomes of foster
youth across the board. Some children are so traumatized by being separated from
their families and communities that they cannot recover. Others experience abuse or
neglect at home or in foster care which makes healing impossible. These obstacles,
however, only underscore the necessity that judges’ decisions squeeze every ounce
of possibility from the dire circumstances. To date, clearly, the many tough
decisions made by judges about important issues in the lives of foster children are
not working out well enough.116
removal will have on issues such as a child maintaining ties with her school, community,
family, and friends. Across the board, removal standards fail to acknowledge or incorporate
into the analysis the poor outcomes for many foster children with respect to education and
financial well-being. They fail to account for the very real fact that removal from a parent
carries proven risks of mental, emotional, and physical harm, including the development of
separation anxiety, depression, and other mental health problems.”).
111

Peter J. Pecora et al., Mental Health Services for Children Placed in Foster Care: An
Overview of Current Challenges, 88(1) CHILD WELFARE 5-26, tbl. 3 (2009), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3061347/?tool=pubmed.
112
Amy Dworsky & Mark Courtney, Assessing the Impact of Extending Care Beyond Age
18 on Homelessness: Emerging Findings from the Midwest Study, CHAPIN HALL ISSUE BRIEF 4
(Mar. 2010), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/publications/Midwest_
IB2_Homelessness.pdf.
113

See generally CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE CASEY YOUNG ADULT SURVEY: FINDINGS
OVER THREE YEARS (2008), available at http://www.casey.org/resources/publications/Casey
YoungAdultSurveyThreeYears.htm.
114
See Christine Diedrick Mochel, Redefining “Child” and Redefining Lives: The Possible
Beneficial Impact the Fostering Connections to Success Act and Court Involvement Could
have on Older Foster Care Youth, 40 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 519 (Spring 2012).
115

Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Adult Crime: Using Investigator Assignment
to Estimate Causal Effects of Foster Care, 116 J. OF POL. ECON. 746, 748 (2008) (“[A]mong
children on the margin of placement, children placed in foster care have arrest, conviction, and
imprisonment rates as adults that are three times higher than those of children who remained
at home.”); see also Doyle, supra note 85, at 1605, tbl. 9 (illustrating greater levels of juvenile
delinquency and teen motherhood, and worse employment and economic prospects for
children placed in foster care, as compared to similarly-maltreated children who were not
placed in foster care).
116

See Liebman, supra note 110, at 141-43 (“The 520,000 children in foster care often live
in unsafe and unsanitary conditions, with poorly trained foster parents and without crucial
mental health, medical, and education services. Even worse, children in foster care are abused
and neglected at a greater rate than other children, and have an increased risk of delinquency
and other behavioral problems. The longer-term statistics are equally bleak. In a recent broad
survey, foster alumni had disproportionately more mental health disorders, significantly lower
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In the next Part, we will explore the environment in which judges make incorrect
removal decisions and in which they are confronted with the difficult, important
decisions described above.
C. The Decision-Making Environment—A Breeding Ground for Mental Shortcuts
We have seen that judges in dependency cases are faced with important decisions
with stakes so high that they literally mean life-and-death to children, and which for
parents and guardians are freighted with perhaps incomparable emotional
significance. Not only are the decisions important, but they are hard to make.
Dependency judges seek to predict the future—will a child be safe? Will she
benefit—whatever that means—from additional visitation with a parent on the basis
of past events?117 Judges in these cases unavoidably and inextricably are tangled in
the famously ambiguous, notoriously unhelpful, legal standard “the best interests of
the child.”118
These difficult, high-stakes choices among shades of gray are rendered in the dim
light of patently suboptimal conditions. To begin, as noted above, the decisionmaking process is hamstrung by a meager factual record.
But are judges making the most of the facts they are given? Do they seek and
find available opportunities to improve the factual record which must form the basis
of their decisions? Or do they jump to conclusions on the basis of “mental
shortcuts”?
It appears that salient factors in the structure and operation of family court
inexorably drive judges to employ heuristics inappropriate for the context. The
resultant cognitive biases distort judges’ ability to sort through available information
to distinguish wheat from chaff, fact from assumption, probative from irrelevant. In
this section, I explore the environmental factors which appear likely to cause
dependency judges to employ heuristics in decision-making. In the section that
follows, I argue that these mental shortcuts lead to harmful cognitive biases.
1. Ambiguous Role of Family Court Judges
Perhaps most fundamental to an understanding of how decisions are made in
dependency cases is to appreciate that making decisions is an unusually insignificant
employment rates, less health insurance coverage, and a higher rate of homelessness when
compared with the general population.”) (citations omitted).
117
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 251 (1975) (“Applying the best-interests
standard requires an individualized prediction: with whom will this child be better off in the
years to come? Proof of what happened in the past is relevant only insofar as it enables the
court to decide what is likely to happen in the future.”).
118

See id. at 229 (“[D]etermination of what is ‘best’ or ‘least detrimental’ for a particular
child is usually indeterminate and speculative . . . . [O]ur society today lacks any clear-cut
consensus about the values to be used in determining what is ‘best’ or ‘least detrimental.’”);
see also Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Introduction: Custody Through the Eyes of the Child, 36 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 299, 300 (Spring 2011) (“[D]ue to the malleability and ambiguity of the
standard, determining the best-interests has proved to be dependent on factors other than a
child’s needs: biases of judges; preconceptions regarding socio-economic class, gender and
race . . . . While the best interests standard is intended to achieve that which is best for
the child concerned, it is also a broad and ambiguous concept subject to manipulation and an
unlimited number of interpretations.”).
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component of the responsibility of judges in these cases. Family Court judges long
have been tasked with responsibilities viewed as special to them and different from
other judges.119 Family and juvenile courts have always been “rehabilitative,”120 and
the court’s parens patriae role has inspired a vision of judges in these courts as
people who “nurture,” “provide guidance,” and even serve as role models for the
youth and families who appear before them.121 The “problem-solving court”122
movement, which has swept family law in the past fifteen to twenty years, has
accelerated the realization of this vision. As of 2002, thirty-four states had “unified
family courts,”123 with authority over all family law matters involving a family, and
expressly adherent to precepts of the therapeutic justice movement, which “evaluates
the legal system by applying mental health criteria.”124
What this means is that many judges in child dependency cases serve as
“confessor, task master, cheerleader, and mentor.”125 Judges function as
“managers,”126 “administrators,”127 coaches, and problem-solvers,128 rather than
119
See Jane M. Spinak, A Conversation About Problem Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. MD.
L. J. RACE, GENDER, & CLASS 113, 124-25 (2010) (“The role of the judge as a leader of a
therapeutic team reinforces the shift of services from the community to the court, as well as
the re-characterization of those services from social responsibilities to individualized needs.
The team leader role also fundamentally changes the nature of the judge’s job.”); Melissa L.
Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of Family
Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
55, 65 (2010) (pointing out that “[u]nlike the purpose of criminal courts, [family courts] aim is
not to punish or penalize, but rather to help families and children.”).
120

Miriam Van Waters, The Juvenile Court from the Child’s Viewpoint. A Glimpse into the
Future, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 236 (1925) (“[N]o juvenile court system
can do its work well unless the judge assumes leadership and responsibility for the entire
situation: court, probation work, detention and treatment. The judge must interpret the work
of the court to the community.”).
121

See Gloria Danziger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L.Q. 381, 382 (Fall 2003) (“[The unified
family court is] a safe haven, a space to protect, to rehabilitate, and to heal children, a site
of nurturance and guidance, understanding and compassion . . . [with the] Court functioning in
the best interest of children and youth, acting in any circumstance . . . exactly as a kind and
just parent would act.”).
122

See Spinak, supra note 119, at 113-14 (discussing the arrival of the “problem solving
court” movement in the mid-nineties.”).
123
Barbara Babb, What Works and What Does Not, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1929, 1945
(2002) (explaining that the number of states with unified family courts has increased).
124

Mary E. O’Connell & J. Herbie DiFonzo, The Family Law Education Reform Project
Final Report, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 524, 531 (Oct. 2006) (“In these courts, judges do not sit
primarily as fact finders or decision makers. Instead, they oversee a multidisciplinary group
of service providers who work with the adults and children whose issues are before the
court.”).
125
JEFFREY TAUBER, CAL. CTR.
MANUAL 5-6 (1994).

FOR

JUD. EDUC. & RES., DRUG COURTS: A JUDICIAL

126

See Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning An Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in
Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 497-98
(1998).
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arbiters. As Professor Holland writes, “[j]udges in these courts do not spend much
time performing traditional judicial tasks, such as finding facts and interpreting
law.”129 Family Court judges encourage and scold parents in an effort to get the
parents to address parenting challenges and obstacles. They encourage and scold
social workers in an effort to get the workers to fulfill their responsibilities, such as
arranging for parent-child visits, referring the child to a therapist, and providing
foster parents with necessary support. Judge Cindy Lederman says of her role as
judge in a problem-solving court, “I’m not sitting back and watching the parties and
making a ruling. I’m making comments. I’m encouraging. I’m making judgment
calls. I’m getting very involved with families. I’m making clinical [therapeutic]
decisions to some extent, with the advice of experts.”130 Judges are provided with
training, so they can become experts in subjects like the “dynamics of domestic
violence,” the effect of substance abuse, and attachment.131
The atmospherics in Family Court prize collaboration and cooperation.132
Mediation is mandatory in many jurisdictions,133 and fundamental components of the
127
See, e.g., Lisa Lightman & Francine Byrne, Addressing the Co-occurrence of Domestic
Violence and Substance Abuse: Lessons from Problem-Solving Courts, 6 J. CTR. FOR FAM.,
CHILD. & CTS. 53, 57 (2005) (“A problem-solving approach . . . posits several new roles for
judges: active case manager, creative administrator, and community leader.”) (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128

See Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court: Getting it Right Between Rhetoric and
Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y, 11, 16 (2009) (“Most [family court] reform efforts have
expanded the court's jurisdiction and supervisory authority in recent years, heralding the
family court judge as the leader of a team of professionals who are solving the problems of
families that come to court . . . . The acceleration of specialized problem-solving courts
within the family court . . . similarly focuses on the judge's leadership role to create and
monitor solutions to families' problems.”).
129
Paul Holland, Lawyering and Learning in Problem-Solving Courts, 34 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 185, 194 (2010).
130

Greg Berman, What is a Traditional Judge, Anyway?, 84 JUDICATURE 82 (Sept.-Oct.
2000).
131

See, e.g., District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-114, 115
Stat. 2109 (2001) (mandating multi-disciplinary training for all Family Court judges,
including training relating to domestic violence and child development); see also Omnibus
Budget Act of 1993 § 13212(b)(5)(C) (1993) (providing funding to state courts for the
implementation of judicial education and training programs).
132

Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to
Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 211 (Apr. 2004) (“[C]hild
protection matters are complex problems and that solutions require collaboration [and the
cooperative] participation of many other professionals.”); Holland, supra note 129, at 186
(finding in dependency court, as in problem-solving criminal justice courts, “erstwhile
adversaries are expected to function as members of a single team with a shared mission.”).
133
See Leonard Edwards, Child Protection Mediation: A 25 Year Perspective, 47 FAM. CT.
REV. 69, 74 (Jan. 2009) (citing pilot program requiring mandatory mediation in child
protection cases. Other jurisdictions, including California and Illinois, have instituted
mandatory mediation programs.); see also The Consistent Use of Child Protection Mediation:
A Key to Timely Permanency in Neglect, Abuse and Permanent Custody Cases, THE JUDGES’
PAGE NEWSLETTER, Oct. 2008, at 19, available at http://www.casaforchildren.org/atf/
cf/{9928CF18-EDE9-4AEB9B1B3FAA416A6C7B}/0810
-
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adversarial system intentionally have been jettisoned.134 Oddly, then, the judge’s
role as decision-maker is ambiguous—even something from which judges
themselves recoil.135
Family Court judges spend much of their time and emotional energy on problemsolving, imagining solutions to unwind knotty tangles, and other tasks which are not
decision-making in its clearest, purest, most-obvious form. The incessant messaging
to which Family Court judges are subjected (“empower families,” “create consensus
among the participants in the case,” etc.), and their actual practices, may cause them
to experience their roles as blurred, and perhaps to bring to the task of decisionmaking—when called upon to do it—a distracting ambivalence.
2. High Caseloads and Time Pressure
In addition, Family Court is marked by high caseloads, which impose time
constraints on all system actors, including judges.136 For example, a 2004 survey
indicates that full-time dependency judges in California are responsible for an
average of 1,100 cases annually.137 A single dependency judge in San Joaquin
County California ruled on as many as 135 cases in a single day.138 Thus, judges can
barely keep up with the demands to appear in court and preside over matters on a
daily calendar and often devote as little as two minutes to each case or decision.139
Little time is available even to reread a case file prior to a court hearing, simply to
reacquaint oneself with the names and identities of the people and current issues

Alternative_Dispute_Resolution_Programs-0019.pdf (Court Appointed Special Advocates for
Children).
134
See Breger, supra note 119, at 71 (reporting that lawyers representing the state in
dependency proceedings regularly caution opposing counsel that dependency litigation is not
an adversarial proceeding); see also Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in
Family Law, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 891, 892 (Spring 2010) (“Both the methods and goals of legal
intervention for families in conflict have changed. The roles of judges and lawyers are
fundamentally different and less important in this new [family court system] where dispute
resolution has largely moved out of the courtroom to [non-legal and non-judicial
personnel].”).
135

See, e.g., Holland, supra note 129, at 195 (describing their activities, judges emphasize
“projecting a message rather than reaching a decision.”).
136
Lowry & Bartosz, supra note 105, at 209 (“Family court judges carry enormous case
dockets of their own and must do so with limited administrative support.”).
137

Admin. Office of the Courts Ctr. for Families, Children & the Courts, Research Update:
Background of Judicial Officers in Juvenile Dependency, RES. UPDATE 3 (Dec. 2005),
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/JOResUpd.pdf.
138
Karen de Sa, Broken Families, Broken Courts: A Mercury News Investigation, Part I:
How Rushed Justice Fails Kids, MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 8, 2008.
139

Press Release, Children’s Advocacy Inst., Federal Class Action Lawsuit Against
Administrative Office of the Courts Challenges Crushing Caseloads of Sacramento
Dependency Court Lawyers: Suit Alleges California’s Courts are Violating Their Own
Caseload Standards for Those Who Represent Abused and Neglected Children (Jul. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/Caseload_Press_Release.pdf.
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involved in the case,140 and even less to calmly and soberly consider the issues to be
decided and the options available.
Unsurprisingly, Wells, Petty, and Brock found that decision-makers under time
pressure employ a variety of effort-reducing, time-saving heuristics.141 Guthrie,
Rachlinski, and Wistrich agree that “judges make decisions under uncertain, timepressured conditions that encourage reliance on cognitive shortcuts that sometimes
cause illusions of judgment.”142
3. Poverty, Race, and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare
As reflected in research by John Johnson,143 Barbara Nelson,144 Joel Best,145 and
Aubrun and Grady,146 the commonly-held understanding of parents involved in the
child welfare system is of deviant, pathological animals who inflict savage brutality
on their children.147 According to Johnson, 70-90% of stories about child welfare are
“horror stories.”148 Other research indicates that 90% of stories which appear in the
media about children and youth are about violence done by or against children.149
Almost every story in the news media describes an individual incident, and is devoid

140
See de Sa, supra note 138 (“high caseloads mean judges regularly rule without time to
probe for basic information.”).
141

Richard E. Petty, Gary L. Wells & Timothy C. Brock, Distraction Can Enhance or
Reduce Yielding to Propaganda: Thought Disruption Versus Effort Justification, 34 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 874, 874 (1976).
142
Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 11, at 783. Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich, who
tested judges’ decision-making processes in a wide variety of experiments, note that “many of
the judges we have studied candidly admit [that] time pressures present an enormous
challenge, often inducing less-than-optimal decision making.” Blinking on the Bench, supra
note 2, at 35.
143

See John Johnson, Horror Stories and the Construction of Child Abuse, in IMAGES
ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 5, 17 (Joel Best ed., 2d ed. 1989).
144
See BARBARA J. NELSON, MAKING
SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 73 (1984).
145

AN

ISSUE

OF

OF

CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA

See JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC
VICTIMS 4-6 (1990).

AND

CONCERN ABOUT CHILD

146

See AXEL AUBRUN & JOSEPH GRADY, HOW THE NEWS FRAMES CHILD MALTREATMENT:
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 3 (2003).
147
According to Nelson and Best, the narrative is rooted in the purported “discovery” by
Dr. Henry Kempe of “child abuse syndrome.” Although Kempe’s 1962 article reported the
results of testing of a small sample of young children, blaring headlines subsequently distorted
Kempe’s findings. For a complete historical and sociological treatment of the origin and
evolution of the narrative of child welfare, see NELSON, supra note 144. See also BEST, supra
note 145.
148

Johnson, supra note 143, at 20.

149

Dale Kunkel et al. Coverage in Context: How Thoroughly the News Media Report Five
Key Children’s Issues, (2002).
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of informative, contextualizing detail.150 Because of child welfare confidentiality
laws present in most states, the only stories which lawfully may be told are stories of
criminal acts.151 As a result, the only stories relating to children in foster care that
may be told and heard are stories of brutal incidents which result in criminal
charges.152
Notwithstanding pervasive assumptions about child welfare, fewer than 25% of
allegations that children are endangered are substantiated. More than 70% of
children in foster care are thought to have been neglected, not abused. Virtually
every child in foster care is from a family with low- or no income.153
In addition, families of color are ensnared in dependency proceedings at rates
that far outstrip their representation in the general population. The alarm sounded
loudly by Dorothy Roberts in the classic, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child
Welfare,154 both data and institutional analysis studies demonstrate that children and
families of color experience every stage of the child welfare system more negatively
than do white children and families.155
Thus, poverty, race, and the overarching narrative of child welfare are salient
aspects of the environment in which dependency judges make decisions about
children and families.
4. Need for Cognition
Experience tells us that some people like to puzzle through problems, enjoying
the challenge of collecting as much information as possible, generating a range of
alternative possible solutions, assessing those options, and finally reaching a
conclusion after painstaking analysis. Others derive less personal satisfaction from
those activities, or actively dislike the experience. Psychology research describes the
former as having a “high need for cognition,” and the latter a “low need for
150

See id. at 7 (five percent of stories about child abuse and neglect include contextualizing
information; seventeen percent of child abuse and neglect stories include information about
policy issues).
151
See LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF
BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE, AND CRIME IN THE NEWS 22 (Apr. 2001), available at
http://www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf (youth are rarely covered by the news
media, unless it is to report on violent acts committed by or against youth).
152

See generally Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and
the Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
153

Mnookin, supra note 117, at 242 (“most affected families are very poor”).

154

DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002).

155

See ROBERT HILL, CASEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM, SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH ON DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE: AN UPDATE
15
(Oct.
2006),
available
at
http://www.cssp.org/reform/child-welfare/otherresources/synthesis-of-research-on-disproportionality-robert-hill.pdf (the disproportionality
rates for out of home placements, derived by dividing the proportion of a racial group in foster
care by the groups’ proportion in the 2000 census, indicate that blacks (2.43) and Native
Americans (2.16) are represented in the foster care population at twice their representation in
the 2000 census). See generally CTR. FOR SOCIAL SERVS. RESEARCH, UC BERKELEY, GROUP
DISPROPORTIONALITY & DISPARITY (VS. WHITE) BY STATE: ENTERING AND IN CARE (2004),
available at http://www.f2f.ca.gov/res/pdf/GAO_Entry_and_In_Care_final.pdf.
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cognition.” 156 In plain English, some of us thrive on confronting complicated
questions with elusive answers, whereas others prefer simpler activities, or nonintellectual ones.
Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris found that decision-makers with a high need for
cognition are likely to take as much time as possible to resolve a thorny problem.157
They will seek out as much information as can be generated that is relevant to
addressing the problem presented, and will reach a decision only after considering
evidence and arguments which illuminate all sides.158 Decision-makers with a low
need for cognition, on the other hand, will try to get the decision-making process
over as quickly as possible.159 Rather than combing through information and
considering multiple points of view, they will seek a decision-making shortcut.160
At first blush, dependency judges may be expected to have a high need for
cognition. Judges arguably sit at the zenith of a profession which trains its adherents
to consider and evaluate arguments. Judging may be even more analytical than
lawyering, because judges are expected to seek the correct answer, rather than
following a client’s instructions. Thus, judging may be a profession which can be
expected to attract people interested in decisional accuracy and who enjoy activities
which engage significant brain functioning, and can be expected to be a profession
which further habituates those people to deep problem-solving.
On the other hand, perhaps an even more important influence on judges’ need for
cognition is the lived, day-to-day experience of state court judges. Much of statelevel trial judges’ time is spent on simple, run-of-the-mill, routine tasks. Many
judges preside over the same kind of case, all day and every day, in an environment
described by Professor Oldfather as “bureaucratized justice.” 161 Many cases are, or
have devolved via courthouse culture, to simple, formulaic affairs. Many judges
spend their days filling in the same blank spaces on the same form orders. Many
judges in state court, where caseload pressures are extreme, 162 and the need for
expeditiousness inescapable, have become functionaries whose role is far more
mechanistic than intellectual.
Thus, the experience of judging may actually diminish judges’ need for
cognition. Because judges on all calendars are under significant time pressure to
reach an answer quickly, they may become habituated to getting things done with

156

John T. Cacioppo, Richard E. Petty & Katherine J. Morris, Effects of Need for
Cognition on Message Evaluation, Recall, and Persuasion, 45 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 805, 805 (1983).
157

Id.

158

Id. at 815.

159

Id.

160

Id. at 817.

161

Oldfather, supra note 11, at 129-31 (“changes in the context in which judging takes
place—and indeed in the nature of judging itself—have affected judges’ perception and
performance of their role. Indeed, some have suggested that what has resulted is
bureaucratized justice . . . [t]his, in turn, results in a reduction in the judge[s’] sense of
responsibility, for [their decisions], and in a consequent reduction in [their] overall quality.”).
162

See de Sa, supra note 138.
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little muss and fuss.163 Moreover, judges are under reputational pressures to get the
answers right, and thus may be inclined to perceive problems as simpler than they
actually are. And theory aside, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich present powerful
empirical evidence that judges “rely heavily on their intuitive faculties.”164
It is unclear, then, whether dependency judges have a high need for cognition or
a low one. The academic and intellectual achievements which tend to decorate
judges’ resumes suggest high cognitive capacity and interest. On the other hand, the
actual pressures of judges’ jobs may rehabituate them to recoil from problems
perceived as complex and to prefer simple problems which require little thought. As
a result, judges may seek decision-making strategies, such as heuristics, which
require little cognition.
5. Self-Regulatory Focus
According to regulatory-focus theory,165 humans engage in both “approachoriented strategies” and “avoidance-oriented strategies.”166 Approach-oriented
strategies are “characterized by an eager form of exploration that encourages the
seizing of opportunities. In contrast ... avoidance-oriented strategies … are
characterized by a vigilant form of exploration that stresses caution against
mistakes.”167
No study has assessed the typical self-regulatory focus of dependency judges.
The conditions under which dependency judges operate, however, seem to
encourage avoidance-orientation. Perhaps above all other factors, the one most
present in the minds of judges and other system actors in child welfare is danger, or
its potentiality. Federal and state laws expressly name “child safety” as the
overriding factor with which judges are to be concerned.168 I have written elsewhere
that the “master narrative of child welfare” is one depicting brutal, savage,
monstrous parents” who inflict brutal injuries and death on their children.169
Although the narrative is demonstrably false, even system actors, whose actual
163

“Judges facing cognitive overload due to heavy dockets or other on-the-job constraints
are more likely to make intuitive rather than deliberate decisions because the former are
speedier and easier. Furthermore, being cognitively ‘busy’ induces judges to rely on intuitive
judgments.” Blinking on the Bench, supra note 2, at 35.
164
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (citing Blinking on the Bench, supra note
2, at 27) (describing results of tests of decision-making processes administered to judges,
demonstrating widespread use of heuristic thinking and resultant decision-making errors).
165

E. Tory Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, 94 PSYCHOL.
REV. 319, 319 (1987).
166

Id.

167

Ellen Crowe, & E. Tory Higgins, Regulatory Focus and Strategic Inclinations:
Promotion and Prevention in Decision Making, 69 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 117, 130 (1997).
168

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 629(2) (2006) (The purpose of [ASFA] . . . [is t]o assure
children’s safety within the home.”) (emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.402(7)
(West 2009) (mandating judicial removal if a “child’s safety and well-being are in danger”)
(emphasis added).
169

Fraidin, supra note 152; see also Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2013).
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experiences could disabuse them of these inaccurate notions, remain deeply in their
sway.170
Thus, many judges’ primary focus is likely to be ensuring safety. This suggests
that judges are likely to seek to avoid error, rather than to seek promotion of health
and welfare. As Professor Chill says, “…[j]udges, like social workers, understand
that a decision not to remove a child, or to return a child home who has been
unilaterally seized by CPS, is much more likely to come back to haunt them than is a
decision to uphold the status quo. Judges thus may order or uphold an emergency
removal even on dubious evidence because they do not want to ‘risk making a
mistake . . . .’”171 It appears likely, then, that the possibility of catastrophic error is
yet another factor present in Family Court which causes judges to short-cut the
decision-making process rather than to consider all available evidence and
arguments, and to soberly determine the most appropriate outcome for a child.
6. Power
According to Andrew Menzel, power encourages action and accomplishment.172
Power also insulates the powerful from consequences of poor or unsuccessful
choices. Thus, Menzel finds that decision-makers imbued with power tend to reach
decisions quickly and abruptly, without taking time to assess available information
or deliberate carefully.173 Menzel observed this effect at even greater levels in
decisionmakers with a significant desire for “interpersonal dominance.”174
Like other judges, those in dependency court are empowered to issue directives
which have the force of law. Dependency judges order compliance by a wide range
of litigants with a wide range of orders relating to a wide range of subjects perceived
as important, such as children’s custody, health, safety, and well-being.
We can predict, then, that dependency judges, charged with making difficult,
high-stakes decisions, are likely to employ a variety of heuristics which short-cut
systematic, deliberate weighing of available evidence. In the next section, I argue
that use of a heuristic decision-making approach in dependency cases is ill-suited for
the context. Rather than improving accuracy, the inevitable use of mental shortcuts
in dependency cases leads to cognitive biases, which distort judges’ perceptions and
cause them to jump too quickly to conclusions.
D. Cognitive Biases
We have seen that conditions in dependency cases encourage judges to rely on
non-systematic, “fast-and-frugal” heuristic methods of making decisions. When
judges hurry through decisions in dependency cases, then, what do they think about?

170
Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in
Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 461 (2003) (“although judges are
supposed to operate as a check on CPS actions, they exhibit the same defensive outlook as
many CPS caseworkers . . .”) (internal citation omitted).
171

Id.

172

Andrew J. Menzel, Power, Persuasion, and Heuristic Processing (June 24, 2010)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, The Florida State University) (on file with author).
173

Id.

174

Id.
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If judges are not influenced by all of the available evidence, what is it that directs
them toward the end result of a decision?
1. Primacy Effect
Judges in family court likely are susceptible to a cognitive bias described as the
“primacy effect.”175 In short, this bias recognizes that what we hear first is what we
remember and what we believe. More technically, the primacy effect, sometimes
termed “belief perseverance,”176 is described by Philip Tetlock as “the tendency to
maintain existing beliefs in the face of evidence that ought to weaken or even totally
reverse those beliefs.”177
The primacy effect may be a significant factor in Family Court shelter care
hearings. Family Court judges often first learn of a family and the allegations of
abuse or neglect against the parent or caregiver by reviewing in chambers paperwork
submitted by the child welfare agency. The documents describe the agency’s
investigative findings and set forth, in more or less conclusory fashion, the agency’s
judgment that the child is in danger. Often, the documents refer to past allegations
of abuse or neglect, whether proven or unproven. In general, the documents include
a substantial amount of hearsay information, reflecting what the investigative social
worker was told by various sources during the course of her investigation.
The judge’s next exposure to the case occurs in the courtroom, where the
government agency presents its allegations in argument and by presenting the
investigating caseworker as a witness. Because the government is charged with the
burden of proving that the child can be protected only in foster care,178 the
government presents its case first. The parent, who may be unrepresented,179 or who
may have met with her lawyer for as little as one hour prior to the hearing,180 is heard
in defense against the potent allegations with which the judge already has been
imbued. The primacy effect suggests that the information provided by the
government via paperwork and in the courtroom may generate in the judge beliefs
175

Tetlock, supra note 54, at 286.

176

RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
177

Tetlock, supra note 54; see also Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing and
Unfreezing of Lay-Inferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, and
Numerical Anchoring, 19 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 448, 465 (1983) (“An
individual is said to persevere with a belief when (s)he continues to subscribe to it despite
discrediting evidence concerning the belief in question.”).
178
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2310(b) (2009) (“A child shall not be placed in shelter care
prior to a factfinding hearing or a dispositional hearing unless it appears from available
information that shelter care is required”); see also D.C. SUPER. CT. FAM. DIV. R. N. 13(a)
(“When the Corporation Counsel moves the Court to place a child in shelter care, the
government shall have the burden of showing that shelter care is required . . . .”).
179

Sankaran, supra note 107.

180

Fraidin, supra note 152, at 47-48 (“A lawyer is appointed for the parent but the lawyer
is not provided the name or contact information of the parent until the morning of the hearing.
For her part, the parent is advised by a caseworker to arrive at the courthouse one hour prior to
the scheduled initial hearing. That single hour will be the only time the parent meets with her
lawyer prior to the initial hearing.”).
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about the family, child, and correct outcome of the foster care placement request
which quickly become deeply embedded. By the time the parents or their counsel
are heard from, the die are cast and the judge’s decision to separate the child from
the family all-but-made.
The primacy effect also may impact decision-making in later hearings. For those
hearings, caseworkers are required to submit a report prior to the hearing, describing
the child’s condition and noteworthy events since the prior hearing.181 The report
ordinarily is due to the court and litigants a week or more prior to the hearing itself,
but in practice often is distributed in the moments prior to the hearing or during the
hearing itself. In either event, the information in the report is the first information
provided to the judge for that hearing. The primacy effect indicates that the
information in the reports may cause judges to quickly form impressions, seek
cognitive closure, and give insufficient regard to information offered subsequently.
Thus, the outcomes of the many varied decisions before the judge may be overly
influenced by social workers’ reports.
Fatigue and the significant time pressures affecting judges in dependency court
may make this environment especially fertile territory for the distortions of the
primacy effect. Research has shown that both of these factors cause decision-makers
to seek “cognitive closure”182 and “seize upon initial cues and freeze on judgments
they imply, according insufficient weight to pertinent subsequent information.”183
Thus, Kruglanski and Freund showed that the primacy effect strengthens when, as in
dependency court, a decision-maker is under time pressure.184 Richter and
Kruglanski found that “mental fatigue” causes a decision-maker to seek cognitive
closure, amplifying the primacy effect.185
Researchers have identified a similar phenomenon in the realm of criminal
sentencing.186 In a 2001 study, Englich and Mussweiler found that “judges are
highly influenced by the prosecutor’s demand, which is the first sentencing

181
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.540(1)(a) (2012) (“If the court finds that the
allegations of the petition are true, it shall order that a report be made in writing by an agency
which provides child welfare services, concerning . . . the conditions in the child’s place of
residence, the child’s record in school, the mental, physical and social background of the
family of the child, its financial situation and other matters relevant to the case.”).
182

Donna M. Webster, Linda Richter & Arie W. Kruglanski, On Leaping to Conclusions
When Feeling Tired: Mental Fatigue Effects on Impressional Primacy, 32 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 182 (1996).
183

Id.

184

Kruglanski & Freund, supra note 177, at 448.

185

Judges experience mental fatigue from high caseloads and the emotional content of the
decisions they are called to make. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-108, at 8 (2001) (citing the
“emotionally taxing work of the family bench” and “concerns [that judges will] ‘burn-out’”)
(citations omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 112-178, at 6 (2012) (citing 2010 letter from D.C.
Superior Court Chief Judge Lee Satterfield to the Committee, in which “Chief Judge
Satterfield noted that the Family Court handles emotionally challenging issues and cases that
can place stress on judges assigned there.”).
186

Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word in Court—A Hidden
Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 705 (2005).
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recommendation that is presented during the court proceedings.”187 To isolate the
effect of the timing of the recommendation, the researchers administered a
subsequent experiment. In the second experiment, they informed subjects that the
recommendation was being offered by a computer science student, without legal
training or knowledge. Nonetheless, “even though the prosecutor’s sentencing
recommendation clearly did not represent any judicial expertise, sentencing
decisions were influenced by it.”188 In a final iteration of the experiment, the
researchers administered the protocol to experienced trial judges. Notwithstanding
their expertise, the subjects too were influenced by the prosecutor’s statements.
Thus, the initial statement of a sentencing recommendation appears to have
significant influence, “even if the . . . recommendation is proposed by a non-legal
expert and the judge is highly experienced.”
It is worth noting that Englich et al., attribute the influence of prosecutor’s
statements to an “anchoring” effect, rather than to the primacy effect. With
availability and representativeness, anchoring is the third major heuristic articulated
by Tversky and Kahneman. The term refers to the influence on a decision, as in an
estimate or negotiation, of the first numerical value proposed as the optimal
outcome. Anchoring, then, has in common with the primacy effect a perseverating
effect. In its classic usages, however, anchoring relates more specifically to
numbers, whereas primacy affects decisions about ideas, concepts, and nonnumerical facts.
Regardless of the particular heuristic and biases with which they are labeled,
however, Englich, et al.’s findings may have substantial relevance in the context of
dependency case emergency custody placement decisions. First, they illustrate, in a
justice context, the weighty influence of the first recommendation made to the
decision-maker. Moreover, we may conceive of a judge’s decision at this stage of a
dependency case as a binary one; the judge has only two options—the child either
may safely reside at home or she may not—and must choose from those. Thus,
when the government’s social worker recommends that the child reside in foster care
and the state’s attorney requests that the judge enter an order accordingly, the
attorney seeks an affirmative response: “yes.” The judge’s only other option is, of
course, “no,” rejecting the recommendation and request. By having the opportunity
to offer the recommendation and request first, the state may, in effect, be placing an
anchoring marker like that of a party to a negotiation or, as in Englich’s studies, a
prosecutor seeking a sentencing outcome.
In any event, whether described as a “primacy” effect or an “anchoring” effect,
abundant evidence demonstrates that decision-makers are heavily influenced by the
first input they receive. In dependency cases, the prosecutor, seeking placement of
the child in foster care, always speaks first. Thus, we can expect that judges will
form impressions and opinions favoring the government’s position promptly, and
then seek “cognitive closure.” At that juncture, they will be unable to fully
assimilate, or assign appropriate weight, to subsequently-acquired information, such
as that provided by the parents or their lawyers.

187

Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects
in the Courtroom, 31 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535 (2001).
188

Englich, Mussweiler & Strack, supra note 186, at 707.
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2. Fundamental Attribution Error and Over-Reliance on Affect
Dependency judges also seem likely to be prone to “dispositional bias in
attribution,” also named the “over-attribution” and the “fundamental attribution
error.”189 This bias reflects the “pervasive tendency on the part of observers to
overestimate personality or dispositional [causes] of behavior and to underestimate
the influence of situational constraints on behavior.”190
In a prototypical
experimental example of this phenomenon, subjects review an essay advocating a
strong position about a controversial topic; on the basis of the essay alone, subjects
assess the writer’s personality and motives. Time and again, subjects attribute to the
essay writer personal attitudes, motives, traits, and biases, even when told that the
essay writer was assigned to advocate for the position in the essay.191
The confluence of race, poverty, and the narrative of child welfare suggests that
dependency decisions may be affected by the fundamental attribution error. Judges
faced with a decision about placing a child in foster care, or any of the other myriad
decisions relating to children’s welfare, inevitably are steeped in the narrative of
child welfare that describes as “beastly” and “monstrous” the parents of children
involved in foster care.192 The narrative causes judges to assume that parents are
likely to have engaged in acts of great viciousness and that those acts resulted from
the parents’ personal, deep-seated, pathological deviance, rather than situational
circumstances.
Many allegations of neglect are not rooted in the individual pathology of a
deviant parent, but are unmistakably situational, inextricably intertwined with
poverty and race. Professor Godsoe has pointed out that the “public child welfare
story” conflates poverty with neglect.193 In other instances, as Professor Gilman
writes, poverty is itself neglect, as in a situation in which a child is without adequate
food or shelter.194 In still other instances, poverty may be an important causative
factor in neglect or abuse, as in situations in which stressors lead to inappropriate
physical discipline.
The over-attribution of dispositional traits to parents involved in child welfare is
exacerbated by the significant racialized component of the narrative itself.
189
Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution
Error, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 227 (1985).
190

Id.; see also Jones, Riggs & Quattrone, supra note 53, cite Lee Ross’s seminal work in
this area as having demonstrated the “ubiquity of overattributing personal dispositions to
account for behavior.” Id. at 1230 (emphasis added); see also id. (discussing “the robust
tendency to observer bias”); see also Gary L. Wells et al., Anticipated Discussion of
Interpretation Eliminates Actor-Observer Differences in the Attribution of Causality, 40
SOCIOMETRY 247, 251 (1977) (noting that observers tend to ascribe greater causal effect to
dispositional factors when there are negative outcomes than do actors, whereas actors tend to
ascribe greater personal credit in circumstances of positive outcomes than do observers).
191
See, e.g., Tetlock, supra note 189 (“Observers . . . infer a significant degree of
correspondence between the essay writer’s stated position and true attitudes even when it is
clearly stated that the writer had been compelled to defend the position taken in the essay.”).
192

See AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 146.

193

Godsoe, supra note 169.

194

Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
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Stereotypic images of promiscuous Black “Jezebels”195 and wasteful Black “welfare
queens”196 compound the specter of violent, parents, embedding in judges’ minds
fearsome, vivid images.
Professor Tetlock points out that “[t]he overattribution effect is the result of
reliance on cognitively simple heuristics.”197 The presence and power of the master
narrative suggests that dependency judges inevitably and unavoidably make
decisions via the heuristics of representativeness and availability.198
Stories about beastly parents and victimized children are inescapably available.
Their messages are not challenged by contextualized stories which would reflect
messages of poverty and race, or the much broader, more truly representative
experiences of children and families involved in the child welfare system. Even if
the media’s need for sensationalism, and confidentiality laws’ restrictions did not
preclude the airing of other stories, they would not likely compete in the pool of
images in judges’ minds with the vividness of stories about death, destruction,
murder, mayhem, drugs, iniquity, and violence.
We also may expect the affect heuristic to be triggered by judges’ reflexive
perceptions of parents who appear before them. If the images promptly available to
a judge are those of savagery and pathological brutality, we may assume that
negative feelings are triggered.199 The judge immediately will feel strongly, and will
recoil from the person—the parent—who generates in the judge those strong,
negative feelings. Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock observe that
195

ROBERTS, supra note 154.

196

Id.

197

Tetlock, supra note 189, at 229.

198

According to Tetlock, “Personal traits or dispositions are generally the most cognitively
available and representative explanations for behavior.
People prefer dispositional
explanations because those are typically the first plausible ones to come to mind and people
rarely bother to consider less obvious situational ones.” Tetlock, supra note 189, at 228; see
also Michal S. Schadewald & Stephen T. Limberg, Effect of Information Order and
Accountability on Causal Judgments in a Legal Context, 71 PSYCHOL. REP. 619, 619 (1992)
(“In situations where one must choose between alternative interpretations of facts, judgments
about which interpretation is most convincing are influenced by the relative ease with which
the competing stories can be mentally constructed.”). Daniel Shuman finds a similar
phenomenon in the decisions of mental health experts. See Daniel W. Shuman, What Should
We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About the ‘Best Interests of the Child’?: An
Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence, 31 FAM. L. Q. 551, 553-54
(1997) (“The research on human judgment and decision making reveals that judgments of
experienced clinicians are as susceptible to error as lay judgments and that experts, like
untrained, lay decision makers, use decision-making strategies or mental shortcuts known as
heuristics, in arriving at decisions that contribute to the error rate. Decision makers
often . . . assume that isolated incidents are representative and capable of being generalized to
a broader range of activities . . . . Decision makers also tend to err by giving inappropriate
weight to information based on its availability, such as relying on more dramatic recent stories
or anecdotes to the exclusion of known statistical information”).
199

Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E. Tetlock, Sober Second Thought: The
Effects of Accountability, Anger and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 563 (1998) (“Anger arises primarily when people
attribute harm to stable, controllable, internal causes within a perpetrator, producing strong
inferences of blame.”).
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[A]nger is the principal emotion associated with justice judgments. . . .
Once anger arises, it activates simple heuristic modes of information
processing. Anger leads people to rely on stereotypes and easilyprocessed rather than effort-demanding cues. It also leads people to
attribute negative outcomes to individuals rather than situational forces.200
Thus, judges likely engage in “over-attribution” due to their anger at the person
whom they believe has victimized a child. Judges also may feel anger that the
accused has caused the judge herself to add to her caseload burdens and confront an
upsetting situation in which she has significant responsibility for very important
decisions.201 Over-attribution may be reflected in decisions that are more punitive
than justified on the basis of relevant evidence, due to a judge’s insistence, contrary
to available information, that an actor’s behavior reflected immutable personal
characteristics, rather than situational influence. 202 In dependency court, punitive
decisions, born of anger and over-attribution, may result in unnecessary initial
separation of children from their families, unnecessarily lengthy separation of
children from their families, and acceptance of inadequate services for children and
families.
If, as Zajonc theorizes, we buy cars and houses we like, and forgo those we do
not,203 it is reasonable to assume that judges’ behavior sometimes reflects judgments
about people whom they do and do not like.
3. Groupthink
Thus far, this Article has analyzed dependency court decision-making, including
the heuristics employed and the resultant cognitive biases, as the province of the
individual judge responsible for each child’s case. Professor Breger, however,
persuasively has characterized decision-making in dependency court as the product
of a group.204 She argues that the dependency court environment is marked by the
conditions which breed groupthink: “group cohesion, structural faults in the
organization, such as insulation of the group and lack of impartial leadership, and a
provocative situational context.”205 Under these circumstances, group members’

200

Id.

201

See Jefferey A. Kuhn, A Seven Year Lesson on Unified Family Courts: What We Have
Learned Since the 1990 National Family Court Symposium, 32 FAM. L. Q. 67, 75 (1998)
(arguing that highly complex cases and the charged emotional atmosphere in family court
causes family court judges to experience high stress, feelings of helplessness, frustration, and
burnout, feelings which correlate to mechanistic decision making).
202
Cf. Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315, 318 (1986) (“a civil child protection proceeding, which can involve
the child’s forced removal from the parents’ custody and the parents’ involuntary treatment,
has indisputably punitive aspects.”).
203

Zajonc, supra note 36, at 155.

204

Breger, supra note 119, at 56.

205

Marceling B. Kroon, David van Kreveld & Jacob M. Rabbie, Group Versus Individual
Decision Making: Effects of Accountability and Gender on Groupthink, 23 SMALL GROUP RES.
427, 428 (1992).
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“strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative
causes of action.”206
Professor Breger and others point out that many of the lawyers, judges, and
caseworkers in dependency cases are “repeat players” in the dependency court
system.207 Many have experience in a large number of dependency cases, and many
of those cases may have involved the very same cast of characters.208 As a result,
Breger explains, the social worker, lawyer for the state, lawyer for the child, lawyers
for the parents, and the judge, act in unity to promote the interests of the group,
rather than the interests of any individual participant, including litigants and child.209
Breger’s description of the “social cohesion” present in the dependency court
environment is consistent with that of other observers who have pointed out the
“fraternity” or “clubby” atmosphere of dependency cases.210
The second and third environmental elements typically present in groupthink
situations also appear to be hallmarks of the dependency court environment. Indeed,
dependency court is distinct from nearly all other aspects of the justice system by the
confidentiality of its proceedings and records. Unlike almost all other areas of law,
child welfare court hearings and records are confidential in most states, with state
laws and court rules preventing press and public from entering courtrooms to
observe proceedings and preventing outsiders from reviewing court files.211 In
contrast, with limited exceptions, such as grand jury hearings212 and some national
security-related matters,213 civil and criminal court proceedings are open to all.
Thus, dependency court is almost-uniquely “insulated” from outside observers and
influences. Finally, the matters at issue in dependency court trigger intense emotion
on the part of many of those involved.214 There can be little doubt that dependency
court is a “provocative situational context.”
206

Janis, supra note 55, at 9.

207

Breger, supra note 119, at 66; see also Buss, supra note 1 at 319 (“the . . . professionals
handle case after case with one another in the same courtroom . . . .”).
208
See Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79
DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 47 (2001) (commenting on the “familiarity that these court workers have
with the system and with each other”); see also Breger, supra note 119, at 72-73 (lawyers
representing parents and lawyers representing the state involved in numerous cases, and
“regularly oppose each other before the same set of family court judges.”).
209

Breger, supra note 119, at 82 (“[T]he desire for uniformity at all costs may nevertheless
harm client interests.”).
210
See Bean, supra note 208; see also Amy Sinden, Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?: A
Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 339, 352
(1999) (describing family court as a “clubby atmosphere, in which all of the individuals in the
courthouse . . . have well-established relationships and a kind of collegiality that comes from
daily contact.”).
211

See infra note 274.

212

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).

213

See United States. v. Ressam, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (holding
that the government has a compelling national security interest in maintaining the secrecy of
intelligence gathering activities and this interest outweighs the need for public disclosure).
214

Breger, supra note 119, at 78.
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According to groupthink theory, the needs of the group may take precedence
over accurate fact-finding and decision-making. As a result, “group processes
resulting from the interaction between group members can interfere with the task
performance of a group.”215 Members of a highly cohesive group may prioritize
maintenance of cohesion, and refrain from raising questions or concerns, or engaging
in debate, for fear of disrupting the cohesive relationships.216
In child welfare, the questions not asked, and the debate not had, so as to
preserve group cohesion, may relate to a view deviant from the conventional wisdom
which supports foster care placements. A master narrative and the heuristics of
representativeness, availability, and affect predispose system actors to see the worst
in families and children involved in independency cases. Assumptions cause system
actors to favor separation of children from their families. So powerful and pervasive
is the narrative that experienced system actors safely can assume that others in the
courtroom, including the judge, will be most comfortable with a decision to place a
child in state custody. If questions or concerns about this outcome somehow emerge
to challenge the narrative in the mind of any individual in the group, then, that
individual is likely to suppress the question, consciously or not, to maintain a safe
place in the unified group.
External role expectations are insufficient to cause group members to stand apart
from the group and to challenge the consensus. This is especially remarkable with
respect to lawyers for a child’s parents. The lawyer’s fundamental responsibility is
to oppose a decision to place a child in foster care, if the lawyer’s client opposes that
outcome. Lawyers are, after all, responsible to their clients first and foremost; a
fundamental tenet of lawyering is that loyalty to a client requires an effort to bring
about the client’s wishes.217 Honoring this principle can bring acclaim, whereas
violation of the obligation of loyalty can bring reprobation and adverse professional
discipline. Nonetheless, the strength of the narrative overpowers even these ethical
and professional concerns. For example, disloyalty consistent with the narrative is
reflected in comments such as that by a lawyer who said to a judge that his client’s
rights likely would be terminated,218 and another lawyer who stated his belief that his
client’s rights “should be terminated.”219 In addition, research demonstrates that
even the professional requirements imposed on lawyers may be insufficient to guard
lawyers from being co-opted.220 Thus, in a groupthink environment, even lawyers
for the parents of a child threatened with foster care may suppress disagreement.
215

Kroon, Kreveld & Rabbie, supra note 205, at 427. According to Irving Janis, the
leading groupthink theorist, groupthink results in “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality
testing, and moral judgments that results from in-group pressures.” Janis, supra note 55, at 9.
216

“[M]embers consider loyalty to the group the highest form of morality. That loyalty
requires each member to avoid raising controversial issues, questioning weak arguments, or
calling a halt to softheaded thinking.” Janis, supra note 55, at 11-12.
217
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2011) (“a lawyer shall abide by
a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.”).
218

In re S.T.W., 39 S.W.3d 517, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).

219

In re J.M.B., 939 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

220

See, e.g., Englich, Mussweiler & Strack, supra note 186.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2358602

952

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:913

In addition, in a setting marked by groupthink, a group with a strong leader may
conform its views to those of the leader.221 The group will take less time to reach a
decision,222 will take less information into account, and the members will evaluate
fewer options and express their own views less. This is especially true if the leader
expresses a view early in the decision-making process, even if the leader’s views are
assumed, rather than stated expressly.223
In child welfare, group participants may know or assume that the view of the
group leader, the judge, is supportive of the government’s request that a child be
placed in foster care, and conform its opinion to that view. Participants may believe
a judge holds this view because the power of the narrative places any other outcome
beyond the realm of the imaginable; thus, even if a judge is not predisposed in favor
of separation, or her view is unknown, group members may assume that she is. In
addition, few requests for removal are denied, even those later found to be
unnecessary, unlawful, and harmful.224 Thus, group members safely can assume that
a judge will “rubber-stamp” the government’s request.225 As a result, the view of
other members of the group, conforming theirs to that of the judge, will support
foster care placement.
IV. ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability transforms people into more discriminating and complex
information processors.226
221

See Breger, supra note 119, at 62 (“groupthink was not intended to address situations in
which a group leader makes clear what the decision should be with others blindly following
his lead. Instead, groupthink seeks to analyze the ‘subtle constraints, which the leader may
reinforce inadvertently,’ thereby preventing individual group members from thinking critically
and independently.”) (internal citation omitted).
222

Id. at 58 ([the] group mentality . . . prevents its members from properly or
independently thinking through their decisions as thoroughly as they should, thereby causing
them to default to short cuts or stereotypes.”).
223
Experiment subjects “shift toward the presumed views of the prospective audience.”
Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 257 (1999); see also Breger, supra note 119, at 82 (“Experienced
lawyers often know what a particular judge prefers in certain cases, even if nothing is
explicitly stated.”).
224

See CPR Report, supra note 57; see also Doyle, supra note 85.

225

RENNE & LUND, supra note 76. A variation on this theme situates the state’s attorney in
the role of group leader in a dependency case. Although the judge nominally rules the
courtroom and announces decisions, the state’s attorney wields significant power in a
dependency courtroom. The state’s attorney’s view is announced early, as the case itself
exists only because the state’s attorney seeks to have the child placed in state custody. The
view of the state’s attorney is unmistakable, and well-known to other participants— which, in
this formulation, include the judge. To the extent that the state’s attorney is viewed as the
leader of the group, then, other participants conforming their view to hers will support the
outcome of a foster care placement.
226

Tetlock, supra note 189, at 229; see also Karen S. Pincus & Michael Favere-Marchesi,
The Impact of Accountability on Auditors’ Processing of Nondiagnostic Evidence, 9
ADVANCES IN ACCT. BEHAV. RES. 1, 2 (2006) (accountability is “the implicit or explicit
expectation that individuals may be called upon to justify their judgments and decisions to
others”).
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When participants expect to justify their judgments, they want to avoid
appearing foolish in front of the audience. They prepare themselves by
engaging in an effortful and self-critical search for reasons to justify their
actions.227
A. In General
Ecologically-inappropriate heuristics which give rise to cognitive biases and
decision errors need not be the end of the story. Under some circumstances,
accountability—“the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called upon to
justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others”228 —can guard against decisions
being made on the basis of mental shortcuts not useful or appropriate for the context,
and attenuate cognitive biases that distort and harm decision-making. Accountable
decision-makers seek out and integrate disparate and even conflicting viewpoints, in
an effort to “anticipate the objections that reasonable others might raise to positions
they might take.”229 According to Lerner and Tetlock, accountability can correct
“‘sins of omission (failing to use a ‘good cue’) and ‘sins of imprecision’ (failing to
integrate information in the normatively prescribed manner).”230 As compared to an
unaccountable decision-maker, then, an accountable decision-maker will seek out
and consider more relevant information and less irrelevant information.231 An
accountable decision-maker also will assign more effectively the proper weight to
important and unimportant information.232 An accountable decision-maker will
consider a wider range of options, and anticipate and evaluate arguments supporting
those options, even when those arguments are in tension or conflict with each other.
Accountability focused on the decision-making process, rather than outcomes, may
be especially effective in counteracting heuristic biases and improving the process
itself.233 This means that decision-makers responsible to an audience for the type of
information the decision-maker considers, the amount of time they spend
considering it, and their openness to considering conflicting views, are more likely to
“reduce a bias or increase complexity”234 of thought.
The benefits of accountability extend even to a meta-cognitive level, as
accountable decision-makers more-accurately perceive the decision-making process
227

Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 223, at 263.

228

Id. at 255.

229

Id. at 257.

230

Id. at 264 (quoting Norbert M. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in
Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 699 n.7 (1996).
231

Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, supra note 199, at 567.

232

Id.

233

See Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, Deescalation Strategies: A Comparison of
Techniques for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses of Action, 77 J. OF APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 419, 425 (1992); Patricia M. Doney & Gary M. Armstrong, Effects of
Accountability on Symbolic Information Search and Information Analysis by Organizational
Buyers, 24 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 57, 60 (1996); see also Karen Siegel-Jacobs & Frank J.
Yates, Effects of Procedural and Outcome Accountability on Judgment Quality, 65
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 14 (Apr. 1996).
234

Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 223, at 258.
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in which they engage, thus permitting them to modify and correct an inadequate or
unsuccessful process. In other words, accountability improves decision-makers’
understanding of their own decision-making process. For example, accountability
reduces decision-makers’ overconfidence in the accuracy of their decisions,
prompting them to engage in more systematic decision-making processes and
allowing them to reevaluate preliminary impressions and opinions.235 Accountability
“increases . . . complexity of thought and, as a result, [improves] predictive
accuracy.”236 Cvetkovich found that accountability improved the accuracy of
decision-makers’ description of the decision-making process they used.237 Hagafors
and Brehmer found that accountability improved the consistency of decision makers’
processes.238 An improved level of self-awareness permits judges to identify and
correct flaws in a decision-making process which can lead to bias and error.239
It is worth noting that accountability is not a cure-all under all circumstances.
Several conditions are required for accountability to attenuate cognitive bias and
improve decision-making. According to Lerner and Tetlock, “self-critical and
effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when decision-makers learn prior to
forming any opinions that they will be accountable to an audience . . . whose views
are unknown.”240 In contrast, actors will attempt to please an audience whose views
are known, and to conform their opinion to that of the audience, and their actions to
those known to be desired by the audience. For example, Adelberg and Batson
found that financial aid officials charged with distributing scarce funds allocated a
small amount of money to all applicants, rather than distributing the correct sum to
applicants who were genuinely eligible, if the official was required to explain to
unsuccessful aid applicants the reason that the applications had been denied.
Officials who were not accountable to disappointed applicants distributed the funds
in accordance with need, the designated criterion for award.241
Perhaps the most important limitation on the power of accountability to minimize
decision-making errors by attenuating cognitive biases relates to the timing of the
235

Id. at 262

236

Neal P. Mero & Stephan J. Motowidlo, Effects of Rater Accountability on the Accuracy
and the Favorability of Performance Ratings, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 517, 523 (1995); see
also Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Il Kim, Accountability and Judgment Process in Personality
Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 706 (1987).
237

George Cvetkovich, Cognitive Accommodation, Language, and Social Responsibility,
41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 154 (1978).
238
Roger Hagafors & Berndt Brehmer, Does Having to Justify One’s Judgments Change
the Nature of the Judgment Process?, 31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE
223, 230 (1983); see also Robert H. Ashton, Effects of Justification and a Mechanical Aid on
Judgment, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL. BEHAV. & HUM. JUDGMENT PROCESSES 292, 293 (1992).
239

Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg, & Philip E. Tetlock, supra note 199, 265 n.8
(“Self-critical attention to one’s judgment processes—induced by accountability—not only
reduces strategy-based errors (i.e., errors resulting from insufficient efforts . . .), it also
reduces certain association-based errors (i.e., errors resulting from associations within
semantic memory . . .)”). (citations omitted).
240

Id. at 264.

241

See generally Sheldon Adelberg & Daniel C. Batson, Accountability and Helping:
When Needs Exceed Resources, 36 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 343 (1978).
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decision-maker’s awareness that she will be accountable for the decision.242 Stated
simply, if the decision-maker learns before making the decision that she will be
accountable afterwards, the decision may reap the host of beneficial effects
described above. On the other hand, if the decision-maker has an opportunity after
making a decision to explain or revisit the decision, she is likely to engage in a
damaging phenomenon called “bolstering,” misremembering or misstating the
reasoning she used and mischaracterizing the evidence on which she relied to reach
her conclusion.
Lerner and Tetlock explain that “pre-decisional” accountability causes a
decision-maker to
(a) survey a wider range of conceivably relevant cues; (b) pay greater
attention to the cues they use; (c) anticipate counter arguments, weigh
their merits relatively impartially, and factor those that pass some
threshold of plausibility into their overall opinion or assessment of the
situation; and (d) gain greater awareness of their cognitive processes by
regularly monitoring the cues that are allowed to influence judgment and
choice.243
Pre-decisional accountability, then, can influence a decision-maker to resist
intuitive, less-effortful heuristic approaches. Instead, a decision-maker with predecisional accountability may engage in a systematic, effortful, deliberate process of
seeking, weighing, and assessing evidence, and reaching a conclusion supported by
the evidence. Tetlock et al., describe the process of deciding with an expectation
that the decision must be justifiable as one of “pre-emptive self-criticism.”244 By
engaging in pre-emptive self-criticism, the decision-maker seeks to avoid criticism
and embarrassment at the hands of others. This effort can attenuate the cognitive
bias that might otherwise have affected the decision, including the primacy bias,
over-attribution bias, and groupthink bias found in dependency court decisions.
Thus, several experiments strongly suggest that pre-decisional accountability can
control the effects of primacy bias, permitting decision-makers to weigh information
in accordance with its significance and probative value, rather than over-weighting

242

On a narrower scale, one experiment found that accountability plus a lack of time
constraints was required to avoid specified processing problems—accountability did not
protect against them on its own. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 223, at 267
(“[A]ccountable participants were immune to primacy effects, numerical anchoring on initial
values, and stereotypic formation only when they were not prevented from systematic
processing by time pressure.”). Similarly, in another experiment, accountability plus lack of
distraction and adequate memory were required to avoid a specified processing problem. See
id. at 267 (“Similarly, accountable participants were immune to the influence of covertly
primed trait terms on impression formation of ambiguous targets only when they were (a) not
distracted by another cognitively demanding task and (b) able to retrieve the relevant evidence
from working memory.”).
243

Id. at 263.

244

Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. OF PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 632, 633 (1989).
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information learned earliest.245 Separately, research suggests that accountability can
attenuate primacy effects specifically caused by fatigue.246
Pre-decisional accountability also may increase judges’ ability to appreciate a
wide range of qualities and characteristics about people whose future acts the judge
is tasked with predicting,247 thus attenuating the dispositional bias in attribution. For
example, Wells et al., found similar results in a sample of ninety-six female college
students.248 Each subject observed another subject undertake a series of actions with
a third person. The third person had been instructed to behave cooperatively with
the second, or uncooperatively. Observers were asked subsequently to assess the
reasons that the third person behaved cooperatively or uncooperatively. Accountable
subjects were less-likely than unaccountable subjects to assume that the actions
reflected the actors’ good or bad personal qualities and traits, and more likely to
ascribe the actions to situational influences and constraints.249 Similarly, research has
shown that accountability lessened less punitive attributions of responsibility.250
In addition, decision-makers with pre-decisional accountability may be lessinfluenced than unaccountable decision-makers by irrelevant “affect,” or their own
feelings of pleasure generated by one or more options under consideration.251 For
example, Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock found that accountable experiment subjects
were less influenced by anger in making a judgment about a person’s actions, and
were more likely than unaccountable subjects to consider “situational constraints and
the extent of the actor’s free will.”252
Finally, research also demonstrates that pre-decisional accountability can
attenuate groupthink effects.253 For example, Kroon, Kreveld, and Rabbie instructed
groups of college students to play the role of members of a university admissions
committee. The committee was responsible for reviewing the curricula vitae of
applicants for an MBA program. Results of the experiment indicate that

245

Tetlock, supra note 54, at 290.

246

Webster, Richter & Kruglanski, supra note 182, at 182.

247

Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 223, at 267 (“[P]reexposure accountability increased the
integrative complexity of the impressions respondents formed of target individuals whose later
behavior was to be predicted . . . . [P]reexposure accountability improved both the accuracy
of behavioral predictions and the appropriateness of the confidence expressed in those
predictions.” (citing Tetlock & Kim, supra note 236)); see, e.g., Tetlock, supra note 189, at
230.
248

Wells et al., supra note 190.

249

Id. at 251-52.

250

See Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, supra note 199.

251

Bodenhausen, Kramer & Süsser, supra note 25, at 629.

252

Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, supra note 199, at 571.

253

Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 227, at 259, 262 (“Accountability often . . . motivates
individual work effort [and] attenuates groupthink . . . .”); see also Marceline B. R. Kroon,
Paul’t Hart & Dik van Kreveld, Managing Group Decision Making Processes: Individual
Versus Collective Accountability and Groupthink, 2 INT’L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT. 91, 109
(1991).
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“accountability promotes vigilant and democratic decision-making procedures, in
which differing points of view can come to the fore and be carefully scrutinized.”254
On the other hand, a post hoc opportunity or requirement to explain or revisit
judgment may cause “defensive bolstering,”255 in which a decision-maker may seek
out and even distort facts in an effort to explain, justify, or reinforce the decision.256
According to Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger, “once people have committed
themselves to a position, a major function of thought becomes the justification of
that position.”257
The phenomena of pre-emptive self-criticism, bolstering, and conformance are
illustrated in Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger’s 1989 experiment.258 Subjects were
asked for their views on four policy topics, affirmative action, tuition at the
University of California, a nuclear freeze, and the death penalty.259 Two groups of
subjects, labeled “thoughts-first” subjects, were instructed to write down their
“thoughts and feelings” on each issue. After these subjects listed their thoughts and
feelings, their attitudes about the subjects were measured.260 Subjects in one
thoughts-first group were told, prior to listing their thoughts and feelings, that their
responses would be “completely confidential and not traceable to you personally.”261
This confidentiality instruction was repeated subsequently.262 The second group of
thoughts-first subjects was instructed that they would be asked later to “explain and
justify your opinions.” Subjects in two other groups, described as “attitudes-first”
subjects, were instructed to commit themselves to an “attitudinal stand” (equivalent
to a policy position) on the issues before writing their thoughts and feelings.263 As
with the thoughts-first subject groups, subjects in one of the attitudes-first groups
were told they would be accountable, and subjects in the other were assured of
confidentiality.264 Accountable subjects did not know the views of the audience to
whom accountability was to be required.
Accountable, thoughts-first subjects (i.e., who had been instructed to reflect on
and articulate in writing their thoughts and feelings about the issues before reaching
254

Kroon, van Kreveld & Rabbie, supra note 205, at 449.

255

Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, supra note 244, at 634.

256

See generally Ola Svenson, Ilkka Salo & Torun Lindholm, Post-Decision Consolidation
and Distortion of Facts, 4 JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 397 (2009); Christie Brown &
Fred Feinberg, How Does Choice Affect Evaluations?, 29 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 331
(2002); Alexander Chernev, The Impact of Common Features on Consumer Preferences: A
Case of Confirmatory Reasoning, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 475 (2001).
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Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, supra note 244, at 634.
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Id. at 632.
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Id. at 634.
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Id. (“After completing the thought protocols, subjects responded to the attitude
scales.”).
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a decision as to their ultimate position on the issues) demonstrated more complex
reasoning and significant pre-emptive self-criticism. These subjects took multiple
factors into account before transforming their thoughts and feelings into a
generalized policy position, and recognized the complicated interplay of those
factors. “These subjects . . . tried to anticipate the various objections that potential
critics could raise to the positions they were about to take (e.g., I may favor capital
punishment, but I understand the opposing arguments).”265
In contrast, the efforts undertaken by accountable, “attitude-first” subjects—
participants instructed to reach conclusions before considering evidence—were
directed primarily toward explaining and justifying the conclusions, rather than
careful or thoughtful analysis of the decisions. In a classic reflection of bolstering
behavior, “[f]ar from engaging in self-criticism, these subjects were concerned with
self-justification—with thinking of as many reasons as they could for why they were
right and potential critics were wrong.”266
Finally, two additional sub-groups of accountable subjects also were created, to
test the effect of accountability to an audience the views of which is known. One
sub-group was told they would be asked to explain and justify their position to a
person known to have “liberal” views on the topics at issue. The other sub-group of
subjects was told they were to explain and justify their position to a person known to
have “conservative” views.267 Accountable subjects who knew the views of the
audience to which they were accountable demonstrated comparatively simple
thought processes, took few factors into account and, in the main, appeared primarily
to be interested in reaching an outcome they anticipated would be approved by the
audience. “Thoughts-first subjects who knew the views of the audience coped by
shifting their public attitudes toward those of the anticipated audience. They
expressed more liberal views to the liberal audience and more conservative views to
the conservative audience.” 268
Accountability, then, can be a blessing and a curse to decision-making processes.
Under some circumstances, accountability can attenuate cognitive biases by
promoting the care and accuracy consistent with pre-emptive self-criticism. Under
other conditions, however, decision-makers may be prompted to position-hardening
behavior, described as bolstering. Tetlock et al., summarize, “[a]ccountability
demands can motivate people to be either more flexible multidimensional
information processors or more rigid, evaluatively consistent information
processors.”269
As we shall see in the following Part, dependency court is marked by a
significant deficit of pre-decisional accountability, and an unfortunate abundance of
post-decisional accountability and judicial bolstering. I argue that bolstering is
encouraged by dependency judges’ extended supervision of dependency cases. I
further argue that effective pre-emptive self-criticism is curtailed by courtrooms and
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Id. at 638.
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267

Id. at 634.
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Id. at 638.

269

Id. at 639.
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records that are closed to the public, and by the limited appeal rights available in
dependency cases.
B. Accountability in Dependency Cases
1. Pre-Emptive Self-Criticism in Short Supply
“Pre-emptive self-criticism,” which encourages careful, deliberate, fact-intensive
analysis of information prior to making a decision, is promoted by “pre-decisional
accountability to an audience with unknown views.” Do dependency judges have
pre-decisional accountability to any audience with unknown views? Do dependency
judges make decisions with an expectation that the explanation or justification of the
decision will subject them to rewards or adverse consequences? Consistent with
Lerner and Tetlock’s observation that decision-makers seek to avoid
embarrassment,270 Lawrence Baum pointedly conceives of “audience” as the people
or groups to whom a judge presents herself, seeking approval, when taking action or
making a decision.271 A judge’s potential audiences include appellate courts, trial
court colleagues, the general public, friends, professional groups, policy groups, and
the news media, including as a vehicle for communicating to members of other
audiences.272
Is there any individual or group, then, to whom dependency judges perceive
themselves speaking when they make decisions? Framed differently, we can ask
whether dependency judges make decisions with an eye toward being judged
themselves.
It appears that appellate courts constitute dependency judges’ only likely predecisional audience. In a state in which dependency court hearings and records are
closed,273 for example, we know that judges simply need not justify their decisions to
public or press, and thus presumably do not experience decision-making as an
explanatory, justification-oriented, or approval-seeking exercise with respect to
public or members of the press, or the audiences who might be reached by the
press.274 Members of the public and press may not be present in the courtroom and
270

See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 227.

271

LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 47 (2006).

272

Id. at 23-24; id. at 22 (“Judges care a great deal about what people think of them.”); id.
at 47 (suggesting judges themselves are an audience for their own decisions, as they seek to
protect and build internal self-esteem; judges have an “interest in establishing a desired image
with their audiences and ultimately with themselves.”).
273

Dependency proceedings are closed in twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia
(Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
See S. AREA CONSORTIUM OF HUMAN SERVS., LITERATURE REVIEW: OPEN JUVENILE
DEPENDENCY COURTS (Feb. 2011), available at http://theacademy.sdsu.edu/programs/SACHS/
literature/SACHS%20Lit%20Review-Open%20%20Courts%20FINAL.pdf.
274
A fundamental cornerstone of American jurisprudence is that courtrooms and court
records are open and available to the public. Alex Kozinski & Robert Johnson, Of Cameras
and Courtrooms, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1107, 1112 (2010) (“The
premise that transparency and accountability are good for institutions has animated our
traditional preference for open courtrooms.”). Thus, with the exception of dependency court,
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may not access court files. Under these circumstances, the public and press do not
serve as an audience for the judge’s decisions. Because courtrooms are off-limits to
those not participating in a hearing and court files are strictly sealed,275 the public
and press will not be exposed directly to the judge’s decisions orally or in writing.
Confidentiality laws also prohibit participants in the case, who will be aware of the
decisions, from speaking about the decisions.276 As a result, those who might be
reached by the press will not learn about the decisions even by second- or third-hand
accounts. Friends, professional acquaintances, and policy groups cannot know of a
dependency judge’s decisions in a state in which confidentiality laws close
courtrooms and records and limit the speech of those involved in a case.
Thus, the judge does not expect to explain or justify her decisions to members of
the public, press, or other groups. The judge need not engage in pre-emptive selfcriticism to gird for that scrutiny. The judge need not please these audiences, and
most American courtrooms are marked by their open doors: in virtually any kind of case,
including cases involving children and domestic violence, criminal law, divorce, and child
custody, press and public may walk in to the courtroom, listen, take notes, and then speak and
write about the events they observed. Written case records likewise are open and available to
the public and press. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573
(1980) (plurality opinion); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super Ct., 980 P.2d 337, 358
(Cal. 1999) (“[E]very lower court opinion of which we are aware that has addressed the issue
of First Amendment access to civil trials and proceedings has reached the conclusion that the
constitutional right of access applies to civil as well as to criminal trials.”); Associated Press v.
Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he public and press have a first
amendment right of access to pretrial documents in general.”); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super.
Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). Indeed, whereas scholars continue to debate the pros and cons of
dependency courtrooms and records being open to press and public at all, compare Bean,
supra note 208 (supporting open dependency courts), with William Wesley Patton, When the
Empirical Base Crumbles: The Myth that Open Dependency Proceedings do not
Psychologically Damage Abused Children, 33 U. ALA. L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 29 (2009), the
debate in other fields has moved to the margins, focusing on such issues as the value of
television cameras in the courtroom. See, e.g., Kozinski & Johnson, supra note 274, at 1112
(arguing that cameras should be allowed in courtrooms because “[t]he public can better
monitor the judiciary—to ensure that its processes are fair, that its results are (generally) just
and that its proceedings are carried out with an appropriate amount of dignity and
seriousness—if it has an accurate perception of what happens in the courtroom. Increased
public scrutiny, in turn, may ultimately improve the trial process. Judges may avoid falling
asleep on the bench or take more care explaining their decisions and avoiding arbitrary rulings
or excessively lax courtroom management. Some lawyers will act with greater decorum and
do a better job for their clients when they think that colleagues, classmates and potential
clients may be watching. Some witnesses may feel too nervous to lie; others may hesitate to
make up a story when they know that someone able to spot the falsehood may hear them talk.
Conscience, after all, is that little voice in your head that tells you someone may be listening
after all.”).
275

Underscoring the lock-and-key quality of court files, a District of Columbia statute
precludes even a child’s parents, whose relationship with their child and Constitutional rights
are at stake, and who are parties to the litigation itself, from accessing some portions of a
child’s file. See D.C. CODE § 16-2332(b) (2012) (listing persons authorized to view “juvenile
social records”).
276

See generally Fraidin, supra note 152, at 39-48 (by silencing parents, confidentiality
laws create a one sided narrative, engendering a court system that devalues and discredits
parents’ stories).
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need not fear embarrassment. Thus, these audiences do not inspire judges to engage
in any of the systematic, deliberate analytical behaviors that can be promoted by
accountability. In a state with closed dependency courtrooms and records, then, the
public, press, and other potential audiences are not available to stimulate dependency
judges to gather a wide range of information, consider opposing viewpoints,
anticipate arguments supporting all sides of an issue, and comb meticulously through
information before making a decision.277
Even in states in which dependency court hearings and records are open to the
public, judges’ decision-making processes may be little-impacted. Although
nominally open since 1997,278 New York’s courtrooms were blocked by armed
guards as recently as 2011.279 More typical is the experience of states such as
Minnesota, where courtroom attendance by members of the public and press is
rare.280 Under these circumstances, dependency judges presumably know it is
unlikely that the public or press will become aware of a dependency-case decision.
It seems unlikely, then, that the remote possibility that a dependency judge will have
to justify or explain a decision exerts meaningful impact on the decision-making
processes of dependency judges in these states. The public and press, and those who
might be reached by the media, do not, it appears, serve as an audience that inspires
systematic thinking by dependency judges.
Appellate courts, expressly established to review lower courts’ decisions, also
may be an ineffective means of promoting systematic thinking by dependency triallevel judges. In some states, the court’s initial hearing decision may be appealed by
any party aggrieved by the decision;281 in others, however, the decision may be
277

It is possible that in states in which dependency courts are closed, judges’ need to build
and maintain self-respect—their internal accountability engine—may fill all or part of the gap
left by the absence of the public and press. We may presume that judges seek to make good
choices, discover the correct answer, and achieve children’s best interests. We may further
assume that many judges believe they ordinarily engage in a decision-making process
appropriate for their tasks. Judges’ subjective beliefs about the adequacy of their decisionmaking processes hardly can mark the end of the analysis, however. The very need for selfassurance that motivates judges to perform for audiences by undertaking a rigorous and
systematic decision making process suggests that emotional self-preservation – a judge’s need
to believe that she is engaged in a meaningful, worthwhile, constructive endeavor -- may
motivate judges to misconstrue their own Herculean efforts, confusing care and anxiety with
effectiveness. Indeed, decision-makers frequently overestimate the accuracy of their
decisions. As noted in Part IV.A., above, in fact, among the benefits of pre-decisional
accountability is a marked improvement in the accuracy of decision-makers’ assessment in the
quality of their decisions.
278
See Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New York Tells Family Courts to Admit Public, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 17, 1997, at A1; see also William Glaberson, In New Guidelines, Officials Affirm
that State’s Family Courts are Open to Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at A32.
279

See William Glaberson, Family Court Says Keep Out, Despite Order, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2011, at A1.
280
See MINN. SUPREME COURT, STATE COURT ADM’R OFFICE, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE
EVALUATION OF OPEN HEARINGS AND COURT RECORDS IN JUVENILE PROTECTION MATTERS,
FINAL REPORT 1, 6 (“[O]pen hearings have led to a slight but noticeable increase in attendance
at child protection proceedings.”).
281

See, e.g., WA. JUV. CT. R. 2.5 (“The court may amend a shelter care order . . . at a
hearing held after notice to the parties given in accordance with rule 11.2. Any party may
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appealed only by the child or the government, but not by the child’s parent or
guardian.282 In practice, parties rarely appeal initial hearing decisions.283 The trial
decision is appealable by all parties; again, however, trial decisions rarely are
appealed.284 And among the dozens or hundreds of court decisions judges make
while they are responsible for a child, virtually none is appealable. The appeals
process, moreover, is slow and impersonal.
The accountability analysis is distorted as well because information about
judges’ decisions may become public, even in a state with strict confidentiality laws,
if a child under the judge’s supervision is injured seriously or killed. Under these
circumstances, the alleged perpetrator may be charged with a criminal offense,
information about which is not restricted from view. Thus, dependency judges are
aware that they will not be called on to explain a decision about a child, unless the
decision results in a child’s injury or death.
Even if a judge does recognize an audience, she probably does not wonder at the
audience’s views. Indeed, the powerful master narrative of child welfare makes it
probable that judges assume that every audience would prioritize protection of a
child’s physical safety above other considerations.285 Judges may further assume
that separating children from their families would be the decision that would best
protect a child’s physical safety, and that it would be perceived that way by any
audience which might review the judge’s actions.
In conclusion, there appears in the dependency system to be little effective predecisional accountability to audiences with unknown views. In states in which
courts are closed, information is unavailable to public, press, judges’ friends and
professional acquaintances, and to any audience other than the participants in the

move to amend a shelter care order.”); see also D.C. CODE § 16-2328(a) (2012) (“A child who
has been . . . placed in shelter care . . . may, within two days of the date of entry of the
Division's order, file a notice of interlocutory appeal.”).
282

See D.C. CODE § 16-2328(a) (2012).

283

A Westlaw search of cases in Florida, Illinois, and Maryland, for example, reveals a
grand total of zero appellate opinions reviewing initial hearing decisions.
284
A Westlaw search of 2011 appellate opinions in Florida, Illinois, and Maryland yields a
total of nine, five, and one appellate decisions reviewing trial courts’ findings of abuse or
neglect. (Author started with the Westlaw Directory, Topical Practice Areas—Family Law—
State Cases; from there he entered the search terms "child abuse and neglect" and then used
the cases synopses to determine whether the cases were decided on a substantive or
evidentiary/procedural issue. He only counted those cases decided on the basis of the
substantive issues. Date of search July 27, 2012. Search also re-run November 23, 2012 with
identical result.)
285
Federal and state laws prioritize children’s safety. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 629(2)
(West 2012) (“The purpose of [ASFA] is to assure children’s safety within the home . . . .”)
(emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.402(7) (West 2012) (mandating judicial
removal if a “child’s safety and well being are in danger”) (emphasis added). Margaret
Johnson argues that judges and other system actors in the field of domestic violence similarly
prioritize safety above other considerations, including the agency and autonomy of women
affected by domestic violence. See Margaret Ellen Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and
Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519
(2010).
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case itself.286 In states in which courts are open, media and public inattention
combine to achieve a similar outcome. As a result, dependency judges likely make
decisions with an implicit or explicit understanding that the decisions will not be
reviewed or scrutinized. The decisions, then, are undertaken virtually in a vacuum,
absent an expectation that they must be logically consistent, incorporative of all
relevant facts, and based on those facts, rather than unconscious stereotypes and
assumptions. Even in states in which dependency courts are open, the only decisions
which may see the light of day are decisions which result in, or are related to, the
significant injury to, or death of, a child. Because the overarching narrative of child
welfare associates safety with children’s placement and perpetuation in foster care,
we may assume that the only decision that might be the result of a systematic,
deliberative process is one to deny a request to place or maintain a child in foster
care. In contrast, a decision to place or keep a child in foster care is unreviewable by
most of a judge’s audiences, depriving judges of extrinsic motivation to explain or
justify the decision and the need to arrive at the decision systematically.
Appellate review does not fill the accountability gap. Even emergency custodial
decisions are not appealable in some states, and few are appealed in states in which
that route is available. Few other dependency-court decisions are appealable,
notwithstanding the many years a judge may supervise a child and the many
important decisions about the child’s life that she may make. Guthrie, Rachlinski,
and Wistrich observe that “trial court decisions [in all subject areas] are generally
final because appeals are only available on limited bases, occur infrequently, and
seldom lead to reversal.”287 Under current circumstances, then, trial judges are
unlikely to be meaningfully affected by the possibility of appellate review.
2. Bolstering in Abundance
Reconsider, v. To seek a justification for a decision already made.
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil’s Dictionary (1906).
Dependency judges may be responsible for a dependent child from the day of the
child’s birth to the day she reaches the age of majority. In twenty-one years, if the
judge holds the minimum number of hearings allowable by law, she will have
considered the child’s fate—her custodial placement and the nearly-infinite number
of issues relating to the child’s health and welfare—on more than forty separate
occasions. Forty custody decisions. Forty decisions about the extent and nature of
visits between the child and her family members. Forty times to decide whether the
child requires a medical appointment not being provided by the social work agency.
And mental health treatment. And is the child in the correct school placement?
Should a lawyer be appointed to help seek additional educational services for the
child? Should the child be assigned a mentor? On and on, the decisions come.
So we must ask: on the thirtieth occasion, or the fifteenth, or even on the third,
how likely is it that the judge will start with a clean slate, gather an armload of
evidence on the question, and painstakingly sort through the pros and cons of the
available options? The answer, of course, is that it is not very likely. Indeed, on the
286

The congenial atmosphere of dependency cases makes it unlikely that judges feel
meaningfully compelled to justify their decisions to the participants in the case. See Breger,
supra note 119 (discussing groupthink in dependency cases).
287

Guthrie, Raslinski & Ristlich, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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fifteenth occasion, not to mention the thirtieth, it might not make much sense to do
so. By that juncture, the judge is heavily-weighted with information gathered over
the course of the many years and many hearings and many social work reports that
have come to paint a picture of the child’s life and form the wallpaper of the case.
But what we know about bolstering suggests that it is not just after thirty reruns
of a decision, or even fifteen, that a decision-maker’s mind closes off a range of
options. Indeed, the research suggests that after just one iteration of a determination,
as we understand from Tetlock et al.’s 1989 experiment, a decision-maker’s primary
goal is to defend the wisdom and insight of the decision. When questioned about a
prior decision, the decision-maker undertakes “an exercise in intellectual selfdefense—the generation of justifications for positions taken.”288
This is the danger presented in child welfare cases. So, although relatively few
children remain under the supervision of a dependency court for twenty-one years,
and even fewer are under the eye of the very same judge for that entire time, our
concerns about judges’ decision-making processes start on a much smaller scale.
Federal and state law require judges to hold an initial hearing and a trial within
days of the child’s placement in foster care.289 Judges are required to hold a
disposition hearing within several weeks after the trial or settlement of the case.290
They hold a permanency planning hearing within twelve months of the child’s entry
to foster care,291 and a permanency review hearing every six months thereafter.292 In
practice, judges often hold hearings far more frequently, including several hearings

288

Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger, supra note 244, at 640.

289

See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2312(B) (2012) (“A shelter care hearing shall be commenced
not later than 72 hours (excluding Sundays) after the child has been taken into custody . . . .”);
see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.507(1)(a) (West 2012) (“The adjudicatory hearing shall be held
as soon as practicable after the petition for dependency is filed and in accordance with the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, but no later than 30 days after the arraignment.”).
290

See D.C. CODE § 16-2316.01(b)(1) (2012) (“The fact finding and dispositional hearing
shall be held within 45 days after the child's entry into foster care or, if the child is not in
foster care, within 45 days of the filing of the petition.”); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.51(1)
(West 2012) (A disposition hearing shall be conducted by the court, if the court finds that the
facts alleged in the petition for dependency were proven in the adjudicatory hearing . . . .”).
291
See, FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.621(1) (West 2012) (“Time is of the essence for permanency
of children in the dependency system. A permanency hearing must be held no later than 12
months after the date the child was removed from the home or within 30 days after a court
determines that reasonable efforts to return a child to either parent are not required, whichever
occurs first.”); see also ALA. CODE ANN. § 12-15-315(a) (West 2012) (“Within 12 months of
the date a child is removed from the home and placed in out-of-home care, and not less
frequently than every 12 months thereafter during the continuation of the child in out-of-home
care, the juvenile court shall hold a permanency hearing.”).
292

See CAL. R. CT. § 5.708(a) (“The status of every dependent child who has been removed
from the custody of the parent or legal guardian must be reviewed periodically but no less
frequently than once every 6 months . . . .”); see also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/228(2)(c) (West 2012) (“Subsequent permanency hearings shall be held every 6 months or
more frequently if necessary in the court's determination following the initial permanency
hearing . . . . Once the plan and goal have been achieved, if the minor remains in substitute
care, the case shall be reviewed at least every 6 months thereafter.”).
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prior to the trial, and permanency review hearings as often as every three months.293
At each of these hearings, with the exception of the trial, the judge is presented with
a decision about the child’s custody: may she safely reside at home, or must she
remain outside the home, with a relative or a foster parent, or in a congregate
setting?
It is true that in many instances, circumstances dictate that a child’s parent or
guardian does not seek the child’s return, and the judge thus is not genuinely
confronted with a decision—a conflict between or among options. It is equally true,
however, that so pro forma are child welfare proceedings, and so automatic and
undeliberative is decision-making,294 that the frequency of genuine contests for a
child’s custody may be suppressed: parents and guardians may understand, even as
early as the shelter care hearing, that an effort to place a question at issue—to force
deliberation and a decision—is fruitless, and perhaps will cause them to be the target
of anger or demeaning remarks. The parents’ lawyers, who have seen it all before
and believe they know the outcome in advance—as Professor Buss writes, “there is a
strong sense of ‘the way things are done’ that drives the planning and decisionmaking process in . . . the child welfare system . . .”—may counsel the parents to not
bother seeking custody.295
But even in this environment, suffused with the master narrative and the
fundamental attribution error and availability and representativeness and “rubberstamping,”296 there often are contests regarding a child’s custody. Even here,
especially early in dependency cases, parents remain hopeful, determined, or simply
confused and in disagreement about the allegations made against them. Parents
regularly ask at a pre-trial hearing, at trial, and in the disposition hearing and
permanency review hearings for their child to be returned to their custody.
What we know about bolstering tells us that the judge cannot hear that parent and
cannot genuinely assess evidence that bears on the merits of that request. The judge
decided at the initial hearing that the child was in imminent danger. It is a
frightening, serious finding, one the judge is not likely to revisit searchingly.
Having found previously that this child was at such risk that her life and limb are
in dire, immediate peril, the judge now is being asked to decide the degree of the
child’s peril. Our brief tour through post-decisional accountability tells us the
fruitlessness of such an inquiry. Rather than seek out evidence and systematically
sort it; rather than anticipate arguments that others might make; rather than consider
opposing viewpoints; rather than engage in searching, pre-emptive self-criticism; the
judge embarks on a Herculean struggle of self-defense. She decided within the past
few months that the child was in imminent danger, that the parents were unworthy of
the tasks that accompany the title, that the family should be disrupted and that
encroachment on a fundamental constitutional right was justified. Bolstering theory
tells us that the judge, now, must reaffirm her decision, and must again find that the
child is in too much danger to be returned home. Bolstering theory tells us, in fact,
293

See, e.g., Pa. Office of Children & Families in the Courts, Three Month Reviews,
PERMANENCY PRACTICE INITIATIVE (2009), http://www.ocfcpacourts.us/permanency-practiceinitiatives/three-month-court-reviews/.
294

See Sinden, supra note 210.

295

Buss, supra note 1, at 320.

296

LUND & RENNE, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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that the judge will be focused less on the decision at hand than on the one that came
before.
If bolstering causes custody decisions to be an increasingly pro forma ratification
of parents’ dangerousness as dependency cases march forward, so too can we
hypothesize that the many other decisions judges are called on to make also reinforce
the same theme. Thus, for example, when a judge must decide whether to direct a
parent to undergo a screening for drug use, the decision seems likely to be influenced
by the dangerousness decisions that have come before. Rather than explore relevant
information that would tend to prove or disprove that a parent uses drugs, the preexisting determination that the parent is dangerous is a thumb on the scales of
justice; the judge’s need to defend the wisdom of the earlier decision makes the
outcome of the later one nearly a foregone conclusion. We may hypothesize a
similarly truncated and distorted decision-making process when judges must decide
on a request by parents and family members to visit with the child.
The dangerousness decision itself is not delinked from the overarching child
welfare narrative of beastly and monstrous parents, but rather a manifestation of the
judgments reflected in the narrative. Dorothy Roberts and Joseph Tulman have
argued that youth suffer the harsh characterizations of the narrative, both derivative
of their parents’ perceived pathology—as fruit of the poisoned tree297—and because
they are simply perceived as “undeserving”298 on their own.
As a result, decisions about the youth themselves may be susceptible to
bolstering effects by being unduly harsh and punitive. Thus, when a judge is
confronted with options that reflect greater or lesser trust in a child or respect for the
child, the judge’s decision invisibly but dramatically may be colored by the judge’s
prior determination that the parent is dangerous and the child unfit to reside in a
family home. Those prior judgments, then, are defended, supported, and ratified by
decisions that may by turns be punitive, angry, or pitying.
For example, one judge terminated court and social work oversight of a
dependent youth, nineteen years old and pregnant with two small children, because,
he said, doing so would make her homeless and likely permit the social work agency
to take custody promptly of her two children.299 In another situation, a Florida jail
contacted a child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), informing the GAL that her youthful
client was incarcerated. The jailer offered to put the youth on a bus to her home
state, if only the social work agency agreed to pay the cost of the ticket. The agency
refused. The GAL pleaded with the judge to direct payment, but the judge refused,
agreeing with the social worker that incarceration might be better for the child than a
foster home.300
The decision-makers who chose a harsh option in these examples unlikely did so
due to a conscious hatred of the youth or a desire to harm the child. To the contrary,
the commitment of dependency judges to support and protect children and youth
cannot reasonably be questioned. Like other humans, however, judges are subject to
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the vicissitudes of the human mind. Like the rest of us, judges seek to avoid
embarrassment and to build self-esteem and achieve the respect of others. We can
expect, then, that dependency judges’ decisions will be affected by their own prior
decisions. Psychology theory tells us that after a judge decides, in a shelter care
hearing that a parent is too dangerous to function as a full-time parent, we should
expect the judge’s subsequent decisions about custody and supports and services for
both parents and child to be influenced by the judge’s need to defend the correctness
of the shelter care decision. This does not mean, of course, that the initial decision
was wrong or that the subsequent decisions are wrong, but opens a window into the
process by which judges reach the conclusions that they do.
V. IMPROVING DECISION-MAKING IN DEPENDENCY COURT
How can we replicate in family court an environment that takes advantage of the
opportunity presented by accountability and which excises the dangers of bolstering?
Unleashing the power of accountability to be a force for good, rather than ill, in
dependency proceedings, requires minimizing the conditions which promote
bolstering. Beneficial accountability also requires processes and structures which
promote pre-emptive self-criticism. The former may be achieved by limiting the
occasions on which a judge makes a decision which closely revisits a prior decision
and by imposing structure on the manner in which the judge acquires information
and on the decision-making process itself. Pre-emptive self-criticism may be
expanded by unleashing the power of existing audiences with unknown views and by
creating new ones. I argue below that these goals may be achieved by opening
dependency courts to public and press, by improving the functioning of audiences in
already-open courts, and by expanding appellate opportunities and the immediacy
and effectiveness of the appellate process.
A. Minimizing Bolstering
As noted above, in most state courts, dependency judges retain exclusive
authority over a dependency case for its entirety. This practice reflects the special
importance placed on the relationship between the dependency judge and the child
and family members, and permits the judge to acquire a cache of knowledge about
the child and family that may assist the judge in planning for the child’s future.
Notwithstanding the potential benefits, however, psychological theory suggests that
a judge’s repeated decision-making may generate instances of bolstering behavior, in
which decisions impose an undue influence on later decisions.301 In this section, I
301

The discussion of bolstering effects in this Article has addressed the potential for such
effects within the confines of a single dependency case, because of the oft-lengthy duration of
those cases and the ongoing responsibility of a single judge for the case. Although beyond the
scope of this Article, I note that another fundamental component of current dependency court
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propose that judges reach decisions together in teams, gain insight from the
experiences of others in “case rounds” sessions, and that the information available
for a judge to consider in reaching a decision be proscribed more narrowly than at
present.
1. Teams of Judges
Courts may wish to expand the pool of judges responsible for decision-making in
a case. For example, a team of co-equal judges could be assigned to each case.
They could take turns holding hearings, or rotate at pre-established intervals, or
collaborate on all decisions. As noted earlier, the initial emergency custodial
decision may be the one most likely to influence future decisions, precisely because
it is the first decision about the family. Thus, cases could be transferred from the
judge who makes that decision to another judge, with future involvement of the first
limited or eliminated altogether.
These recommendations also may have downsides and limitations. In some
cases, judges’ ongoing involvement permits the judge to build a constructive
relationship with the child, family, and others involved in the child’s life. The trust
and knowledge accrued over the course of months and years can provide valuable
insight for judges into the capabilities and potential achievement of all involved.
Some youth perceive the judge as a caring authority figure. It is possible that
relationships such as these would be less-likely to develop were a single judge’s
involvement diluted by the involvement of others. It is also possible that the new
judge would not be much more likely to revisit or reverse the decision of the original
judge than the original judge herself.
2. Case Rounds
“Case rounds,” a teaching methodology commonly-used in medical and clinical
legal education, may offer the benefits of additional voices, without generating the
concerns inherent in team-judging. Described as clinical legal education’s
“signature pedagogy,”302 case rounds create an opportunity for a wide range of
people to provide insight to the decision-maker, without shifting ultimate decisionmaking responsibility. One of the experiences at the core of many law school
clinical courses, a case rounds session typically unfolds with the presentation by a
student-lawyer of a problem or concern that has arisen in a case.303 In general, the
student is likely to be faced with a lawyering decision, such as whether to file a
will help the judge resolve future cases involving the family. Notwithstanding these potential
benefits, however, psychology theory suggests that judges’ decisions in one case involving a
family may cause a bolstering effect in later cases involving the same family, thus distorting
judges’ decision making processes. To the extent that decisions in later cases relate to earlier
decisions—and indeed, the basis for the one-family, one-judge model is precisely that a
judge’s later decisions will be informed by earlier exposure to the family—conditions for
bolstering would be present. Under those circumstances, judges inadvertently may perceive
the later decision to be an opportunity to defend or justify the correctness of the earlier, and
cut short their assessment of information in the later instance.
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motion, how to uncover facts, or how to improve a relationship with a client. The
student presents the facts and law relevant to the decision she must make, and asks
fellow clinical students to listen, think, and share their insights, borne of their own
lawyering or other life experiences. The session frequently resembles a large-group
conversation, focused—sometimes loosely—on addressing the problem presented by
the student and generating a wide range of options from which she can craft a
response to the problem.304 The session, then, can help the student make a decision
about the problem or issue in the case.305 As Professors Bryant and Milstein write,
In subjecting their decision-making to exploration by their peers,
student lawyers get a window in rounds into how and why others may see
different choices. They begin to identify which contexts matter in
problem definition and how they shape solutions . . . . They [may
understand] their clients’ problems differently . . . . [In a case rounds
session,] students explored a range of choices possible in their cases, as
well as the assumptions underlying particular choices.306
The idiosyncrasies of dependency court are by now well-established.307 The
virtues of case rounds are especially resonant in light of Professor Holland’s
observation that in a problem-solving court, “instead of assessing contested stories
from competing parties, the judge typically receives a consensus report from the
court ‘team.’”308 Where judges are deprived of robust debate among parties as to the
existence and significance of facts, case rounds may provide a means for judges to
gather from peers information and insights which might otherwise have failed to
occur to them. Premised on the assumption that the problem-solving imagination of
the case rounds presenter is limited by her own experiences, and that the wideranging experiences of case rounds participants offer rich, varied material from
which to draw, case rounds offers a vehicle for the expression of fresh perspectives
which may, in turn, open pathways to unexplored decision options.
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3. Regulation of Information Available to Judge
Another approach to controlling and minimizing the effects of earlier decisions
on later ones would be to impose structure and constraints on the information a judge
may consider in making decisions. At present, most custodial decisions, and
virtually all other decisions, are made on the basis of informal, unstructured
argument and representation, rather than in evidentiary hearings with sworn
witnesses limited by prohibitions against hearsay. As a result, “non-competent
evidence is often allowed to shape the facts of the case.”309 Judges acquire
information to make these decisions prior to the hearing from reports submitted in
advance by caseworkers. They also hear from the caseworker, lawyers, litigants, and
service providers, and review documents submitted by any of these individuals. The
structure provided by stricter regulation of the information provided to the judge,
such as that created by application of rules of evidence, may cause the judge to focus
on information permissibly-considered and to exclude that which may not. Courts
also may wish to consider creating checklists and benchcards which would expressly
structure judge’s decision-making processes, and perhaps make them less-vulnerable
to the unseen influence of prior decisions and the unconscious preconceived notions
generated by those decisions.
These suggestions require judges to gather more information than they currently
do in conditions of bolstering. At present, bolstering theory suggests that a judge
presented with a decision subsequent to the initial custody placement decision
gathers and processes little new information, but instead primarily seeks out and uses
information that will cause the decision to reflect confirmation of the earlier
decision. Hearings conducted pursuant to rules of evidence may be slower, morehalting affairs. Elaborate benchcards and checklists expressly expand the universe
of information deemed relevant to the judge’s decision. Under conditions of time
pressure, courts and judges may find this unpalatable. In the sway of the child
welfare narrative, they may believe it unnecessary.
B. Increase Pre-Emptive Self-Criticism
1. Counter the Narrative of Child Welfare
Countering the narrative of child welfare, which describes children’s parents as
savages, beasts, and monsters, may be an important element to ensure that the judge
does not know, or assume she knows, the audience’s substantive views. The
pervasiveness of the existing narrative may cause judges to assume that an audience
is interested in a single outcome, namely the separation of the child from her family.
The power of the narrative may make it impossible for judges to believe that an
audience is interested in the decision-making process, but instead to assume that the
audience will be satisfied only by the outcome which reflects the greatest
punitiveness. As I have written elsewhere, the narrative may be modified by
opening dependency courts in all states; current restrictions on participants’ ability to
share with the press and public their experiences and observations about cases cause
only the harshest, most sensational stories to be available to the public. As noted
earlier, the only stories which lawfully may be told about child welfare are those
which reinforce the narrative; stories of murders and severe injuries which, because
they result in criminal charges, are not confidential.
309
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For the narrative to be remade, child welfare system actors must learn to listen
for stories that would contribute to a new world-view. Lawyers, judges, and social
workers are imbued with the overarching narrative, and operate in a world rigidly
controlled by that narrative. System actors expect danger and harm and negativity,
and reproduce it by focusing on the deficits and pathologies of families involved in
the system. This self-perpetuating cycle can be overcome, as I have written
elsewhere,310 by a more-realistic assessment of the strengths and assets present in
families. As system actors view child welfare differently, their stories about child
welfare may change. Those stories, in turn, can rebuild a new narrative. As this
happens, judges may be less tied to an assumption that their audiences seek only
foster care placements and similarly-punitive decisions, thus permitting
accountability to have the desired effects.
2. Open Dependency Courts
Pre-emptive self-criticism also can be generated by opening all child welfare
courts and records, so the judges can have audiences of the in-court (observing)
public, in-court (observing) press, and readers of the press. The “public audience”
may be either members of the public who have an interest in the particular case
before the court, such as family members, friends, and neighbors of the child, or
members of the community with an interest in Family Court processes generally,
such as members of a community “watchdog” organization. Those with an interest
in the outcome will not provide effective accountability.
The court itself could establish a monitoring corps, which deployed observers to
courtrooms on a regular basis and assigned staff to review documents in the court
files. Another approach would be to establish a community watchdog group that has
a regular, ongoing presence in the courtrooms and promises to review files as well.
Community or court-based monitors should include in their mission statement an
expression of substantive neutrality and process-orientation.
To create a process-orientation, observers could be trained regarding optimal
procedural steps, and could be armed with a standardized instrument permitting
regularized monitoring of procedural components of judges’ work.
These
components might include the number of parties who provide information or express
an opinion leading to a decision, the conditions under which those voices are heard
(i.e., sworn or unsworn, biased or not, rules of evidence or not, cross-examined or
not), and the amount of time devoted to gathering information and considering the
information before the decision is made, etc. The judge could be made aware ahead
of time of the specific components of the monitoring.
Another approach to infusing a process with accountability is to include or
expand an evaluation component. This would mean that judges would be assessed
or reviewed more frequently and more effectively, and the results would have
positive or negative consequences. Judges could be affected by the prospect of
assessment and review if a greater range of orders were appealable, and if the
appeals process were more expeditious. Judges also could be evaluated by press
reports or community watchdog reports. A community group could regularly
publish a review of its activities, with description and opinion of judges’ activities.
310
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3. Reason-Giving
In addition, judges would be more accountable if they were required to give
reasons for the decisions they reach. Most dependency court decisions are issued
orally, and then memorialized in writing. Observers and watchdogs could be
instructed to listen for judges’ oral explanations of their decisions in court, and to
evaluate judges on the fulsomeness and logic of their reasoning. Written orders
could be reviewed for the depth and persuasiveness of the reasons set forth. One
important change would be to limit or discontinue the use of “form orders,” which
are used to record almost every decision made by a dependency judge. Form orders
create a convenience for dependency judges, who are heavily burdened by large
caseloads. Nonetheless, the use of “form orders” discourages reason-giving. These
orders are primarily forms with check-boxes and fill-in-the-blank spaces. Where
space is allowed for explanation and reason-giving, it is very limited.
4. Strengthen Appellate Review
Pre-decisional accountability also may be increased by expansion of appellate
rights in dependency cases. Shelter care decisions should be appealable in all states,
by all parties. Another approach, as-yet untried, would be to designate as appealable
a small, randomly-selected sampling of dependency court decisions. The availability
of appeals from other decisions, such as those regarding visitation and a child’s longterm plan, also could create in trial judges’ minds an expectation that their decisions
must satisfy an audience.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article shares a tremendous amount of information, detailing social
psychologists’ findings about a wide range of issues relating to decision-making and
accountability. The psychology research has been done; the findings are, in relation
to many subjects, tried and tested; and there are lessons to be learned, generalized,
and used. At the same time, we make best use of knowledge by appreciating its
limits, and the limits of conclusions that can be drawn from it.
Current knowledge raises unmistakable concerns about decision-making
processes in dependency court. Some of the available research-based conclusions
seem to be robust, and we may reasonably hypothesize about the application of those
findings. For example, decision-makers under time constraints, with a low need for
cognition, in a setting characterized by groupthink and in which stereotype is
rampant, are likely to use speedy, intuitive decision-making processes. Dependency
judges operate under time pressure, and may tend toward heuristic processes because
of their conditioned need for cognition and the effect of the overarching narrative of
child welfare. The atmosphere of dependency court may generate groupthink, and
dependency judges’ ambiguous role-definition may affect the decision-making
process they employ. Research also tells us that pre-decisional accountability to an
unknown audience can attenuate bias, and that post-decisional explanations offer
decision-makers an opportunity to self-protectively bolster, or harden, the certitude
of a prior conclusion, discouraging a fresh look at a new decision. Dependency
court seems to have too little of the helpful kind of accountability, and too much of
the harmful kind.
But those assertions are more nearly hypotheses than conclusions. Our
knowledge about dependency judges’ decision processes is analogic, rather than
supported by direct evidence of dependency judges’ practices. Most research from
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which decision-making theory is derived was conducted in carefully prefabricated
experimental settings, with subjects merely in role as decision-maker. Professor
Mitchell warns of “the difficulty of achieving psychological realism in experimental
studies of legal problems.”311 The subjects knew, as they made decisions, that they
were participating in an experiment, that they would leave their roles at the end of
the day, and that no real consequence would attach to them or anyone else.
Guthrie et al., advanced the boundaries of our knowledge about judges’ decisionmaking by studying as subjects judges themselves. Guthrie et al., also contributed
by attempting to evaluate the subject-judges’ decision-making processes in tasks
analogous to those confronted in real-life judging, such as settlement negotiations.312
Their work moves us closer to reliable data from which to draw conclusions, but
does not fully ground analysis of this issue. Their work, too, reflects experimental
findings, not assessments of real-world functioning, with real-world pressures and
consequences. The judges in those studies were trial judges, like those whose
decision-making processes are the subject of this Article, but it is unclear whether
any served in the unique hothouse of state-level dependency court. This important
work deepens, but does not conclude, a conversation.
This Article carries that conversation forward by applying to a specific, realworld context the Guthrie et al., findings, and the findings of many, many social
psychologists. This Article, too, however, resides at a level of generality forced
upon it by the absence of information about dependency judges’ real decisions in
real cases involving real children and families.
The paucity of direct evidence about dependency judges’ decision-making
processes requires elision, for now, of important differences between and among
decisions. For example, even with respect to a shelter care decision, there is a vast
range of variables that may affect the process a judge uses to reach a conclusion.
Judges may engage in different approaches to processing based on the age of the
child in question, or the number of children involved, or whether the child is
threatened with separation from a single parent or a two-parent household, and many
other factors. Variance among later decisions in dependency cases may be even
greater. The passage of time, maturation of the child, and evolution of relationships
between the judge and the child, family members, and foster parents may affect
judges’ approach to addressing matters that arise in cases. In the absence of
empirical and qualitative data, this Article treats as equivalents judges’ decisions
regarding visitation, medical care, and custodial placement; in fact, however, it
seems possible, if not likely, that judges’ decision-making processes may vary in
accordance with the nature of the decision being made. So too might judges’
responses to accountability differ from decision to decision, from day to day, and
from judge to judge. One judge may be interested in seeking higher office, and thus
may be especially responsive to a perception of voters’ interests. Another judge may
be a long-term resident of a small town, and feel keenly his neighbor’s eyes as he
shops for groceries.
Thus, recommendations to improve decision-making in dependency court are
offered in the previous section in recognition that they can be grounded in theory,
but not empirical evidence. To capitalize on recommendations for change, then, we
must consider future directions for research that will promote a truer understanding
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of decision-making in dependency court. How might the information generated by
experiments be supplemented to strengthen the evidence base about decision-making
by dependency judges? 313
Interviews of judges, both before and after decisions are reached, could unearth
the information the judge believes she took into account and the weight she assigned
to it. In-court observers might listen to judges’ real-time announcement of decisions
and articulation of factors relevant to their decisions. This process can build a
foundation by uncovering what it is that judges think they do when they decide.
Data about a wide variety of variables potentially relevant to decision-making
could be collected and catalogued by interviews, observations, and review of court
files. A child’s race, age, family composition, the number and nature (relatives,
friends, social workers) of witnesses in a hearing, a judge’s daily calendar: which of
these factors matter, and which do not, when dependency judges make decisions?
Perhaps decisions can be predicted by the time of day a hearing is held—might a
judge, like other humans eager to leave work on Friday afternoons, take less time
with decisions presented in hearings held then? How are judges’ decisions affected
by the many substantive trainings they attend? Do they, for example, use in their
cases knowledge gained in seminars about family violence, or children’s medical
needs? Collecting this information would permit finely-grained conclusions to be
drawn about the correlation of each variable with decision outcomes, and the
interaction of each variable with others.
The work of psychologists and others mentioned and cited in this Article teaches
about decision-making and accountability, and also about limitations. Their
experiments yield copious amounts of information, but that information seems
primarily to illuminate all that we do not know. In his celebration of ignorance,
Professor Firestein anticipates our quandary, and celebrates it. He writes,
[F]acts serve mainly to access . . . ignorance . . . . [S]cientists don’t
concentrate on what they know, which is considerable but minuscule, but
rather on what they don’t know . . . . [S]cience traffics in ignorance,
cultivates it, and is driven by it. Mucking about in the unknown is an
adventure; doing it for a living is something most scientists consider a
privilege.314
“Muck[ing] about in the unknown” of dependency court, legal scholars, like the
scientists with whom Firestein primarily is concerned, may be carried by ignorance,
as well as curiosity and obligation, to greater understanding of the environment in
which so many children and families have so much at stake.
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